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The Papua New Guinea government has adopted a range of measures aimed at 
reducing the supply of illicit small arms and light weapons in response to persistent 
problems with their use in inter-communal fighting and crime. However, these measures 
have been largely ineffective at reducing the level of armed violence in PNG, in part 
because of the failure to also address the demand that exists for these weapons. A nascent 
demand reduction agenda has emerged at the local level throughout Papua New Guinea in 
response to the failure of the national government to adequately address small arms and 
armed violence problems. This thesis provides a detailed overview of national, regional 
and international initiatives to address small arms issues and examines how they have been 
implemented in PNG.  It then examines initiatives by local community groups and NGOs 
that are aimed at reducing small arms and armed violence and considers how successful 
they have been.  
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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
Papua New Guinea has been affected by armed violence for many years, with high 
rates of death and injury inflicted upon people and communities. One contributing factor to 
this armed violence is the proliferation of small arms throughout the country over the last 
twenty five years. While there have been efforts at addressing the issues of SALW and 
armed violence in PNG, most have focused on the supply side of arms control in order to 
restrict access to SALW by PNG residents. This thesis examines these efforts and also 
measures designed to reduce demand for weapons. It does so against the backdrop of a 
growing global interest in the prevention of violence. This analysis takes place in three 
parts. First, the nature of SALW and armed violence issues globally and in PNG is 
examined in order to establish the context of this analysis. Second, the instruments that 
have been adopted and applied in PNG in response to these issues are examined and their 
effectiveness is also evaluated. Third, the concept of demand reduction is analysed in order 
to demonstrate how it works, the role it has played in programmes aimed at reducing 
SALW and armed violence in other locations around the world and in PNG, and how 
effective it has been in reducing demand for SALW. This thesis concludes with a 
discussion of how demand reduction might be better applied in PNG to prevent the spread 
of SALW and armed violence as well as some lessons that may be taken out of these 
findings. 
 
Methodology 
 The methodology that will be used in this analysis is a detailed single case study. 
This case study will draw on the wider literature on demand reduction and explore its 
relevance to Papua New Guinea. The data that will be used for this analysis will be 
gathered from official documents from the likes of government sources, regional bodies 
like the Pacific Islands Forum and national submissions to international bodies like the 
UN, international treaties, NGO reports and news articles. A problem encountered with the 
data is that it is based entirely on secondary sources. This lack of primary source data is 
due to two factors. The first of these is that due to economic and time constraints, having 
only one year to complete the thesis and only limited resources at hand, making the 
expensive trip to Papua New Guinea to conduct field research was not an option. The 
second factor that has influenced the reliance upon secondary sources for gathering data is 
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that I was not able to conduct interviews, for several reasons. I attempted to conduct three 
interviews via email but did not receive a reply to my initial email from one recipient, was 
forwarded onto the PNG office of another and heard nothing back, and the third was 
unable to be completed in time, due to the subject’s busy travel schedule. It is for these two 
reasons that the data used in this analysis is entirely obtained from secondary sources.    
 In order for this thesis to proceed, there are terms that require defining. These are 
small arms and light weapons and armed violence. When defining SALW, the Oxford 
International Encyclopaedia of Peace defines it as revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles 
and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns under the small arms 
umbrella, and heavy machines guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade 
launchers, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank and anti-
aircraft missile launchers and mortars smaller than 100mm calibre are among the weapons 
categorised as light weapons.
1
 A more general definition of SALW is described as 
weapons that are manned and operated by a single person or a small crew of two or three 
people.
2
 In order to define the term armed violence, Krause and Muggah use the World 
Health Organisation’s definition of violence, which states that violence is “The intentional 
use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or 
against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in 
injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation”.3 When it comes to 
armed violence, the involvement of a weapon (in this case SALW) in the violence 
definition is implied. Krause and Muggah also categorise armed violence into five sections, 
inter-personal violence (involving domestic or social violence); collective violence (social 
or political violence, pre or post-conflict); criminal violence (economic violence 
committed by individuals or groups); conflict (described as ‘intense political violence’); 
and institutional violence (violence that is committed by the state).
4
 It is within the context 
of these definitions that the rest of the analysis within this thesis will proceed.  
 
                                                          
1
 Young, Nigel J., "Small Arms." The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace, 2010, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195334685.001.0001/acref-9780195334685-e-
659?rskey=dBZJvM&result=1&q=small%20arms, (accessed 4 December 2012) 
2
 United Nations Conference to Review Progress Made in the Implementation of the Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 
"Frequently Asked Questions", 2006, http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/faq.html, (accessed 4 
December 2012) 
3
 Krause, Keith. & Muggah, Robert., "Measuring the Scale and Distribution of Armed Violence", 2007 
http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/regional-publications/Measuring-the-Scale-and-
Distribution-of-Armed-Violence.pdf, (accessed 4 December 2012), p.1 
4
 Ibid 
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Chapter Two – Small arms as a global issue 
 
This chapter will examine how SALW and armed violence has become a global 
issue. It will do this by examining the recent growth in the small arms trade, both legal and 
illicit, and how arms enter and are circulated within the SALW trade. Following this, the 
impact of SALW on armed violence will be explored further. How the SALW trade has 
been addressed globally through international instruments will be examined along with an 
evaluation of their effectiveness. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the context and 
scale in which the problems of SALW and armed violence are experienced around the 
world, in order to then examine the extent to which these problems are also experienced in 
Papua New Guinea in particular. 
 
The rise of small arms proliferation as an issue 
  
Small arms trade 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the 
importance of large-scale stockpiling of many types of conventional arms. This meant that 
the trade in larger conventional arms such as tanks, artillery and aircraft declined in the two 
decades following the end of the Cold War. In contrast, the trade in SALW continued to 
grow unabated over this same period.
5
 In 2006, the legal trade in small arms was estimated 
by the Small Arms Survey to be worth $1.58 billion.
6
 This trade was dominated by a 
relatively small group of states, with the top SALW-exporting states for the period 2001-08 
being the United States, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Italy, Russia and China, all 
exceeding $US 100 million in exports.
7
 At the next level down, there were a further thirty 
one states who exported between $US 10 and 99 million of SALW during the same 
period.
8
 Many of these exporting states also featured prominently among the largest 
importers of SALW at this time. The six largest arms importers (in excess of $US 100 
million) were the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia and the United 
                                                          
5
 Boutwell, J., and M.T. Klare, ‘A Scourge of Small Arms’, 2000, http://www.amacad.org/news/scourge.aspx 
(accessed 21 May 2012) 
6
 Stohl, R. & Hogendoorn, E.J., ‘Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and 
Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development’, 2010, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/03/small_arms.html (accessed 28 May 2012), p. 5 
7
 Small Arms Survey, ‘Small Arms Transfers: Exporting States’, 2011, 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-11.pdf (accessed 30 
May 2012), p. 1 
8
 Ibid 
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Kingdom. In addition to this, there were thirty two states who imported between $US 10 
and 99 million worth of SALW.
9
 Most of the legal small arms trade has been found to be 
made up of arms manufacturers selling their products on the open market. In 2010 it was 
estimated that there were 875 million small arms in circulation throughout the world, with 
226 million of these in the stockpiles of state security forces.
10
 The rest of these arms were 
in the possession of non-state actors and private citizens.   
Occurring alongside the legal trade in SALW is an illicit market where weapons are 
illegally trafficked within and across state borders. Rachel Stohl contends that this illicit 
network for small arms can be traced back to the Cold War, where major powers employed 
private arms dealers to coordinate the covert supply of arms to allies. When the Cold War 
ended these agents simply continued to deal arms illicitly.
11
 Most of the illicit trade in 
SALW can be found at the regional or local level, with very small numbers being 
trafficked between continents.
12
 Related to this is the ‘ant trade’ in small arms, which has 
been viewed by the Small Arms Survey as one of the most significant forms of illicit 
trafficking because it is made up of numerous small consignments of weapons that 
eventually build up to significant levels in an area.
13
 In a 2004 report, the illicit trafficking 
of SALW was estimated to be a $1 billion a year global industry.
14
 Stohl has highlighted 
seven ways in which SALW leak into the illicit market.
15
 The first means of leakage is that 
SALW can be leaked from the legal market into the illicit trade by states doing so or 
permitting shipment through their territory directly to the recipient. The second way 
SALW leak into the illicit trade is via lax security of state arms stockpiles, which often 
makes them a target for theft or accidental loss. The third leakage source is during periods 
of conflict or other instability, when stockpiles are vulnerable to being raided. The fourth 
means of leakage highlighted by Stohl is that significant numbers of SALW end up being 
lost by the state every year. The fifth way in which SALW are said to leak into the illicit 
market is that they have been known to be sold by state security forces, often as a result of 
                                                          
9
 Small Arms Survey, ‘Small Arms Transfers: Importing States’, 2011, 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-12.pdf (accessed 30 
May 2012), p. 1 
10
 Stohl, R. & Hogendoorn, E.J., ‘Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and 
Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development’, p. 5 
11
 Stohl, R., ‘The Tangled Web of Illicit Arms Trafficking’, 2004, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/10/b217737.html (accessed 28 May 2012),  p. 23 
12
 Small Arms Survey, ‘Illicit Trafficking’, Small Arms Survey, 2011, 
http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/de/weapons-and-markets/transfers/illicit-trafficking.html (accessed 30 May 
2012) 
13
 Ibid 
14
 Stohl, R., ‘The Tangled Web of Illicit Arms Trafficking’, p. 21 
15
 Ibid, p. 22 
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poor pay or allegiance to another group. The sixth leakage source of SALW is that civilian 
owners of both legal and illegal small arms are often the targets of theft, and are viewed as 
‘soft’ targets. The seventh and final means of SALW leakage into the illicit market 
highlighted by Stohl are disparities in domestic purchasing laws which enable the leaking 
of legal arms into the illicit market, whereby some states allow the purchase of multiple 
weapons which are then on-sold illegally, frequently within neighbouring states. In 
addition to leakage from legal supplies to illicit markets, there is also an illicit 
manufacturing industry. While the numbers of weapons that are illegally manufactured are 
comparatively small, they still have a similar impact, in terms of contributing to violence 
and instability, as weapons leaked from legal stocks.
16
 The illicit trade in SALW forms but 
one part of a wider black market, which deals in the likes of drugs, timber, diamonds and 
people. It is in this way that the legal and illicit trades in SALW combine to form the 
global small arms trade. The impact of small arms, both legal and illicit, will be explored 
further in the next section.  
 
Effects of small arms 
 The trafficking and proliferation of SALW affects states and people in a number of 
ways. One of the most obvious is the contribution they make to armed violence. Following 
the end of the Cold War, the dynamics of global conflict shifted so that intra-state conflict 
became the major form of conflict, with a marked decline in inter-state conflict. Intra-state 
conflict has typically been found to be dominated by SALW rather than the large weapons 
that are prominent in conflict between states. These two factors have meant that the 
relationship between small arms proliferation, armed violence and development has been 
viewed with increasing concern.
17
 Deaths sustained as a result of armed violence can be 
separated into two categories, direct conflict deaths and non-conflict violent deaths. The 
risk assessment for death from direct conflict is substantially lower than the risk of death 
from non-conflict violence. According to the Geneva Declaration Secretariat, direct 
conflict deaths make up only ten to twenty per cent of all deaths from armed violence with 
the remainder being from non-conflict violence.
18
 It has been reported by the Secretariat 
                                                          
16
 Stohl, Rachel, ‘Fighting the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms’, The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 
vol. 25, no. 1, 2005, p. 63 
17
 Capie, D., Under the Gun: The Small Arms Challenge in the Pacific, (Wellington: Victoria University 
Press, 2003), p. 15. 
18
 Geneva Declaration Secretariat, "Global Burden of Armed Violence", 2008, 
http://www.genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence/global-burden-of-armed-
violence-2008.html (accessed 28 May 2012), p. 9 
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that in the years 2004 to 2007, an average of fifty two thousand direct conflict deaths were 
recorded every year, though this figure is believed to be relatively modest in comparison to 
the total figures that include those that go unrecorded.
19
 As mentioned previously, the 
numbers of non-conflict violent deaths have historically been found to significantly 
outnumber direct conflict deaths. From 2004 to 2007, on average there were around 2.0 
violent deaths from direct conflict per one hundred thousand people compared to 7.6 per 
one hundred thousand for non-conflict violent deaths.
20
 In 2004, it was estimated that there 
were 490,000 non-conflict violent deaths. Of these deaths, it has been estimated that sixty 
percent were firearm related.
21
 In post-conflict environments, the continuing presence of 
small arms perpetuates the cycle of violence by contributing to the likes of homicide, 
assault, extortion, gang violence and kidnapping, which negatively affects populations. 
Boutwell and Klare state that “years of internal conflict are followed by high rates of social 
and criminal violence made possible by the easy access to small arms and light 
weapons.”22 It is in this way that SALW directly contribute to armed violence and 
specifically armed violence-related deaths, through both direct conflict deaths and non-
conflict violent deaths. 
 The second significant effect of the trafficking and proliferation of SALW (and 
associated armed violence issues) is their impact on development. Because small arms 
proliferation and armed violence disproportionately affects poor states, this often impedes 
development efforts that may be occurring within the state. Stohl and Hogendoorn state 
that “at the United Nations Millennium summit in 2000, states acknowledged that the 
availability and misuse of illicit small arms and light weapons undermined efforts to 
alleviate poverty and promote economic growth.”23 Armed violence can force internal 
migration, destroy infrastructure, enable corruption, weaken state structures, increase crime 
and use up valuable financial resources that states have at their disposal.
24
 The use of small 
arms in armed violence imposes significant costs on a state, by undermining the most 
productive sections of the labour force, increasing costs on the health sector and other such 
issues. In addition to this, armed violence also reduces the likelihood of states achieving 
                                                          
19
 Geneva Declaration Secretariat, "Global Burden of Armed Violence", p. 9 
20
 Ibid,  p. 26 
21
 Ibid, p. 67 
22
 Boutwell, J., and M.T. Klare, ‘A Scourge of Small Arms’ 
23
 Stohl, R. & Hogendoorn, E.J., "Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and 
Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development”, p. 13 
24
 Small Arms Survey, "Impact on Development",  http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/armed-violence/social-
and-economic-costs/impact-on-development.html (accessed 6 June 2012) 
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their Millennium Development Goals.
25
 The global economic cost of armed violence is 
estimated to be hundreds of billions of dollars every year.
26
 In addition to these direct costs 
that SALW and armed violence impose, they can also serve to divert resources away from 
significant avenues such as social welfare programmes towards the likes of further arms 
purchases. Key infrastructure and other development projects can be threatened by 
instability and foreign donors are more likely to be discouraged while conflict or other 
armed violence is occurring.
27
 As well as the short term effects of small arms and armed 
violence upon development, much of the economic and social effects can last for years to 
come. Small arms and armed violence can serve to perpetuate underdevelopment in poorer 
states, and prolong poverty among civilian populations within these states.  
 
Global responses to small arms proliferation 
 There have been a number of global initiatives over the last two decades that are 
aimed at addressing the trade in and proliferation of small arms. This section seeks to 
examine these global initiatives in greater detail. The UN Programme of Action on the 
Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (UN PoA), Wassenaar Arrangement on 
Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
(Wassenaar Arrangement), UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms 
Protocol), the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the Arms Trade Treaty will all be 
examined. 
  
UN PoA 
 The purpose of the UN PoA is to establish a range of politically binding measures 
for states to take at the national, regional and international levels in order to prevent, 
combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW. The UN PoA sets out ten pillars to be 
implemented in order to achieve this goal.
28
 The first of these measures for implementation 
is for governmental bodies to be established with the responsibility for drafting policy 
                                                          
25
 Geneva Declaration Secretariat, "Armed Violence Prevention and Reduction: A Challenge for Achieving 
the Millenium Development Goals", 2008, http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Geneva-
Declaration-Millennium-Development-Goals.pdf (accessed 6 June 2012) 
26
 Geneva Declaration Secretariat, "Global Burden of Armed Violence", p. 89 
27
 Muggah, R., "Globalisation and Insecurity the Direct and Indirect Effects of Small Arms Availability", IDS 
Bulletin, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2001, p. 75 
28
 Schroeder, M. & Stohl, R., "Small Arms, Large Problem: The International Threat of Small Arms 
Proliferation and Misuse", 2006 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/SmallArmsFeature (accessed 30 
May 2012) 
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aimed at addressing the illicit small arms trade and facilitate communication between these 
organisations in different countries. The second of these is that states must enact national 
legislation that regulates the manufacture, transport, storage, transfer and disposal of small 
arms. The third measure for implementation is that states must establish laws that 
criminalise the unauthorised manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade in SALW. The 
fourth measure that states are required to implement is to ensure that national arms 
stockpiles have effective security and management. The fifth measure for implementation 
of the UN PoA is that those stocks of small arms that are surplus to requirement are to be 
collected and destroyed by the state to prevent their leakage into the illicit trade. The sixth 
measure required of states to implement is that they must ensure that effective measures 
are in place to regulate the import, export, transit, retransfer and end use of small arms, and 
their enforcement. The seventh measure for implementation is legislation to effectively 
regulate arms brokering, including the likes of end user certificates, are required to be 
established by the state. For the eighth implementation requirement, the state must put in 
place a regime that enables the marking and tracing of small arms, so that their movement 
can be monitored to determine whether they are leaked into the illicit market. The ninth 
measure for implementation is that states are required to establish disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration programmes in order to remove small arms from 
circulation following conflict, disband armed groups and ensure combatants are 
successfully reintegrated into civil society. The tenth and final implementation measure of 
the UN PoA is that it recommends that states work together at national, regional and 
international levels to achieve these goals and eliminate the illicit trafficking of SALW. 
States are required to submit national reports on implementation of the UN PoA, which 
help to monitor its progress around the world. Kytomaki and Yankey-Wayne have reported 
that an encouraging number of countries are fulfilling the reporting obligation which 
suggests that the problem of illicit small arms trafficking is growing in importance 
throughout the world.
29
 When evaluating the significance of the UN PoA, Stohl and 
Hogendoorn have stated that “the Programme of Action is seen and used as a global small 
arms framework in the absence of a comprehensive legally binding treaty.”30  
                                                          
29
 Kytomaki, E. & Yankey-Wayne, V., "Five Years of Implementing the United Nations Programme of 
Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons", 2006, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/E-Co-
Publications/SAS-UNIDIR-2006-5-years-impl-UN-PoA.pdf (accessed 30 May 2012) p. xvii 
30
 Stohl, R. & Hogendoorn, E.J., "Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and 
Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development”, p. 26 
The passing the legally-binding Arms Trade Treaty in the UN General Assembly occurred following the 
completion of this thesis 
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Despite the positive effect that the UN PoA has had, it also suffers from a number 
of weaknesses and criticisms. Because of the voluntary nature of national reporting, the 
level of reporting provided by states has varied considerably, particularly between regions. 
While some states report their activities in full, others are more limited in their reporting. 
In the Asia and Pacific-Oceania regions, a little over half of states have submitted at least 
one national report.
31
 When this is broken down further to include only the Pacific-Oceania 
region, the results are worse. For the years 2002 to 2005, there were one, three, four and 
four national reports submitted respectively. At the same time, there were no reports 
received from eight Pacific-Oceania states and no reports at all from the Cook Islands and 
Niue, which may be a result of NZ handling much of their foreign affairs.
32
 This is 
compared to seventy two per cent of states in Africa and ninety one per cent in Europe 
submitting reports.
33
 When reporting is made, some pillars of the UN PoA are more 
reported upon than others. The national legislation and export, import and transit controls 
pillars are most widely reported upon with the brokering and public awareness pillars least 
reported on.
34
 The UN Programme of Action has experienced some success in promoting 
the issue of illicit trafficking of small arms throughout the world along with the 
implementation of some of its pillars. Despite this, there is still work to be done to improve 
implementation of all its aspects and gain increased uniformity of implementation 
throughout the world. 
 
 Wassenaar Arrangement 
 The objective of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional 
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies is to bring the transfer of conventional 
weapons and dual-use goods and technologies further out into the open in order to bolster 
security and stability throughout the world. When Wassenaar members undertake such 
arms transfers, they are required to only do so if they are assured that such action will not 
contribute to ‘destabilising accumulations’.35 Transparency of transfers of conventional 
arms and dual-use goods and technologies is increased by making it easier for members to 
exchange information related to the import and export of these items. The Wassenaar 
                                                          
31
 Kytomaki, E. & Yankey-Wayne, V., "Five Years of Implementing the United Nations Programme of 
Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons", p. xviii 
32
 Ibid, p .221 
33
 Ibid, p. xviii 
34
 Ibid 
35
 Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, 2012, "Introduction", Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, 
http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html (accessed 1 June 2012) 
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Arrangement group was responsible for creating the Best Practices Guidelines for Exports 
of Small Arms and Light Weapons, which sets out the standards required for declining a 
small arms export license. These guidelines include the possibility of arms fuelling 
terrorism or being supplied to terrorists, undermining another states’ security, infringing 
upon existing arms control agreements, fuelling on-going conflict, threatening peace or 
regional security, being forwarded or on-sold without export license, use for repression or 
human rights abuses, enabling organised crime and use outside of the legitimate defence or 
security needs of the recipient state.
36
 Six of the biggest arms exporters and importers 
within Wassenaar, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and US, have additional 
meetings between themselves outside the normal Wassenaar arrangements which are in 
more depth and involve the exchange of more extensive information.
37
  
The Wassenaar Arrangement has experienced some weaknesses. These include a 
lack of consensus between members around expanding the scope beyond information 
gathering and exchange, some members limiting the information they exchange, lack of 
consensus around which states to label ‘states of concern’ or the definition of a 
‘destabilising transfer’, and the absence of significant arms exporting states, including 
Belarus, China and Israel.
38
 Agreements such as Wassenaar are often criticised by those 
who seek to obtain the items they cover as “basically cartels with a common interest not 
merely in preventing the spread of destabilising arms and technologies, but in restricting 
supply to raise prices.”39 These groups are also often seen as an attempt by Western elites 
to protect their dominance within these industries.
40
 Wassenaar has attempted to mitigate 
these views by bringing recipient states into the fold and trying to facilitate measures 
aimed at the demand side to further restrict the spread of small arms. The Wassenaar 
Arrangement has served to increase transparency of SALW transfers and strengthen export 
controls between its forty one members. Its limited membership reduces its effectiveness, 
particularly because of the absence of several prominent arms exporters, but it has been 
reasonably effective in increasing transparency around arms transfers. 
 
                                                          
36
 Stohl, R. & Hogendoorn, E.J., "Stopping the Destructive Spread of Small Arms: How Small Arms and 
Light Weapons Proliferation Undermines Security and Development”, p. 28 
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 UN Firearms Protocol 
 The UN Firearms Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition requires members to enact 
measures, including legislation, in order to criminalise the illicit manufacture, trafficking 
and modification of markings on firearms, and is legally binding upon states.
41
 States are 
required to store information relating to firearms, their components and ammunition and 
the markings that are on the weapons. The weapons are required to be marked at the point 
of manufacture, import and transfer. States are also required to assist one another in tracing 
illicit arms, parts and ammunition. It requires states to establish import and export 
licensing regimes for these weapons. To ensure the prevention of leakage of legal arms 
into the illicit market and illicit manufacturing of arms, components and ammunition, 
states are required to ensure their security at the point of manufacture, import, export and 
transit and to strengthen border security and inter-agency cooperation between police and 
customs. The Firearms Protocol requires the verified destruction of deactivated firearms. 
The Firearms Protocol also facilitates the exchange of information between states relating 
to illicit arms traffickers, how arms are being concealed during illicit manufacture and 
trafficking, trafficking routes, practices of traffickers and their own legislative activities 
aimed at illicit manufacture and trafficking. States are also encouraged to impose 
regulation upon arms brokers and their activities. As at June of 2009, seventy nine states 
had signed and ratified the Firearms Protocol with a further fifty two having signed but not 
ratified, with the United States and Russia not having joined.
42
 The UN Firearms Protocol 
directly addresses the illicit trafficking and manufacture of small arms and, unlike many of 
its fellow international agreements, is legally binding upon its membership. But, in a 
similar vein to its contemporaries, it suffers from only a small number of states having 
signed and an even smaller number fully ratifying, with some of the largest arms producers 
not involved. 
 
UN Register of Conventional Arms 
 The aim of the UN Conventional Arms Register is to promote security and stability 
and reduce tensions by seeking to prevent large scale build-ups of arms. The Register is a 
reflection of the era in which it was created, with the prospect of war between states being 
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perceived as the greatest danger felt by states in 1991.
43
 As a result of this, the range of 
conventional arms that it encompasses are those that feature most prominently in inter-state 
conflict. Its seven major categories are battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-
calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missiles and 
missile launchers. In addition to these seven major categories, however, there is also a 
category of ‘voluntary additional background information’ in which states can report on 
their SALW holdings. The details that states are invited to provide include where the arms 
are exported to and imported from, the size of transfers, their destination or source, local 
stockpiles and numbers manufactured within the state and imports and exports of SALW.
44
 
In the two decades since the Register’s creation, questions have been raised about its 
relevance in an era where the primary threat is no longer from inter-state conflict. The UN 
Office of Disarmament Affairs has stated that “since the end of the twentieth century, front 
warfare and large-scale battle, which depend on major conventional weapons systems, 
have all but ceased to be the manifestations of conflict.”45 Because of the shift of conflict 
from primarily inter-state military campaigns to intra-state insurgent conflicts and from 
professional armed forces to rebels, terrorists and other unprofessional forces, this has 
meant that SALW are the main category of weapon used in conflict today. The UN 
Register of Conventional Arms is a valuable resource for increasing the transparency 
around conventional arms stockpiles, but the voluntary nature of the reporting of SALW 
stockpiles and transfers means that it is largely inadequate in this area. 
 
Arms Trade Treaty 
 Finally, the Arms Trade Treaty is designed to regulate the global arms trade.  This 
treaty was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2013 and is currently open for 
ratification, but the movement in support of a global arms trade treaty began as a civil 
society campaign for legally binding regulation of the arms trade in the early 1990s.
46
 The 
desire for this treaty was based upon a number of problems surrounding the legal sales of 
SALW. This included their sale to states where they are likely to threaten peace and 
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security at the national, regional or international level, their use in violating international 
humanitarian or human rights law, use in carrying out genocide, crimes against humanity 
or war crimes, the possibility of their leakage to organised crime or terrorists, their 
potential to undermine development and the unapproved re-export by the buyer. When the 
ATT is ratified, it is hoped that it would further bolster efforts at addressing the illicit trade 
in SALW, through measures such as strengthening national trade controls to a minimum 
required standard in order to achieve a uniform standard between states.
47
 The final version 
of the ATT passed with the support of 154 states, 3 opposed and 23 abstentions. It covers 
tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack 
helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers, and SALW, their parts and 
components as well as ammunition. It excludes hand grenades and land mines. The treaty 
does not explicit ban arms transfers to non-state actors; however it is argued by some that 
this is covered by aspects of the UN Charter.
48
 Prior to adopting the ATT, one of the most 
controversial aspects of the proposed Arms Trade Treaty was that any agreement which 
rules when a state is forbidden from allowing an arms sale to proceed is viewed by some as 
infringing upon their own state sovereignty and that it is the sovereign right of states to 
make such decisions. It is in this way that the concept of the Arms Trade Treaty evolved 
from a concept put forward by civil society into a fully-fledged treaty that gained the 
support and approval of the UN General Assembly. 
 This chapter has illustrated the extent of both the global legal trade and illicit trade 
in SALW at the global level as well as some of the effects that these weapons have been 
found to have in conflict and non-conflict zones around the world. In addition, the 
measures that have been enacted at the international level in response to these issues have 
also been illustrated in addition to a brief examination of how effective they have been at 
addressing SALW globally. These international measures that have been looked at are the 
UN PoA, Wassenaar Arrangement, UN Firearms Protocol, UN Register of Conventional 
Arms and the Arms Trade Treaty. 
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Chapter Three – Small arms and armed violence in Papua New Guinea 
 
 This chapter will establish the context of the SALW and armed violence problems 
that are experienced in PNG specifically, in order to gain a clear picture of the extent of 
these issues that require addressing. This chapter will illustrate the specific SALW and 
armed violence issues experienced within PNG. It will discuss the legal and illicit transfers 
of SALW both into and within PNG, including the sources and kinds of weapons involved. 
Following this, the chapter will outline the role of SALW in armed violence in PNG, 
particularly its role in inter-group fighting, assorted crime and political violence. When 
writing on issues relating to SALW in PNG, there are some issues around gathering data 
that are faced by the researcher. Much of this relates to issues around what we know and 
the nature of reporting on PNG. Like many problems with state functions in PNG, the 
official data that is available on SALW and armed violence is often incomplete or 
inadequate in that the reporting capability in different parts of the country varies. In 
addition to this, much of the media reporting on SALW and violence in PNG often focuses 
on occurrences of gun violence, giving a distinct impression of PNG as a ‘Wild West’ of 
the Pacific. These occurrences are then frequently used to generalise the extent of armed 
violence across the country. Despite this ‘Wild West’ impression, there is a dearth of clear, 
generalisable evidence with which to draw precise conclusions about SALW and armed 
violence in PNG. Capie states that “while PNG’s ‘gun problem’ is often discussed, a lack 
of reliable statistical information makes it difficult to make categorical statements about 
the scale and nature of the challenge.”49 This thesis has to work within the limits of the 
data available to researchers and problems that exist around reporting on PNG.  
  
Legal small arms 
 Papua New Guinea contains some of the highest levels of legal and illicit small 
arms and light weapons in the Pacific. In 2012 it was reported that there are 3.1 million 
SALW in the possession of civilians in the Pacific region.
50
 This equates to a ratio of one 
firearm per ten people in the region, a figure that is almost fifty per cent greater than the 
rest of the world. Additionally, it was also reported that there are fourteen civilian-held 
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firearms in the Pacific region for every one military or police firearm.
51
 When it comes to 
PNG in particular, it features as having the highest rate of civilian firearm possession in the 
Melanesian sub-region. The total number of SALW in civilian possession has been 
estimated at 72,000, a rate of 1.2 firearms for every 100 people. This is compared to the 
number of SALW in the possession of the military and police, who hold 19,000 SALW.
52
 
When compared to the rest of the world, it was found in 2003 that arms exports to PNG 
and the wider Pacific region were small. During the period 1998 to 2000, the value of 
export licenses from the United States (which is among the most openly recorded globally) 
to PNG was $US 325,769 for the period.
53
 In the year 2000, PNG declared total SALW 
imports worth $160,000, which came from both Australia and the US.
54
 Such shipments to 
state stockpiles have included the likes of a consignment of eighteen ‘military machine 
guns’ in 1996, 450 rifles and 8 carbines worth $99,250 in 1998 and four grenade launchers 
in 1998/99.
55
 Private firearms retailers in PNG have received similar consignments in the 
past. This has included the likes of six hundred handguns and six hundred shotguns that 
were received between 1994 and 1998.
56
 It can be seen that the position of PNG within the 
legal trade of SALW has historically been small when compared to the rest of the world; 
however they still possess the highest levels of civilian-held firearms in the Melanesian 
region.
57
 
In the decades following PNG gaining independence from Australia in 1975, the 
security forces of PNG acquired a wide array of SALW from a number of different 
sources, prior to a period of reform in the mid-2000s. By the 21
st
 century, this wide array 
of small arms ranged in both age and state of repair. Among these were large numbers of 
Self-Loading Rifles (SLR) and M16A2 assault rifles in addition to smaller numbers of 
others like Heckler & Koch G3 assault rifles, Singaporean Ultimax-100 light machine 
guns, 9mm Sterling sub-machine guns, the Colt M60 and others.
58
 During a 2004 audit of 
PNGDF firearm stocks, the audit head stated that they had nine thousand SALW recorded 
as the official starting inventory figure for the audit, but that it could potentially have been 
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up to a thousand more than that.
59
 This audit revealed that of these nine thousand SALW, 
1,501 were missing. This was revised to 694 several months later.
60
 Between the 2004 
stocktake and 2007, PNGDF holdings were reduced from 5,700 to 2,300, representing a 
sixty per cent reduction in the number of arms.
61
 This reduction included reducing the 
number of ‘weapons systems’ maintained by the PNGDF from fifty eight to just eleven. 
When compared with police forces of other Pacific nations, the RPNGC maintains large 
stocks of SALW. In 2002, police firearms stockpiles were estimated to contain 
approximately 4,400 firearms for its 5,311 sworn police officers.
62
 These weapons 
included AR15 and SLR assault rifles, MP5 sub-machines, Ultimax-100 light machine 
guns and various others.
63
 It is in this way that there are substantial legal stocks of SALW 
within PNG, particularly amongst the PNGDF, RPNGC and license-holding private 
citizens. 
 
 Illicit small arms 
 While illicit SALW have been sourced through a variety of means, the largest 
numbers of illicit SALW in PNG have been found to be obtained through leakage from 
legal stocks. Following decolonisation and the subsequent exit of Australian personnel, the 
security of PNG’s weapons stockpiles began to deteriorate as increasing numbers of arms 
went missing as a result of lax management and interference from political elites like 
MPs.
64
 The destination for many of these weapons was the five Highlands provinces of 
PNG. The first reports of firearms deaths emerged in 1987, and what began as a relative 
trickle of SALW leaking grew substantially following the 1992 national elections when 
state stockpiles of SALW were raided by new members of parliament in order to gift to 
their constituents.
65
 This triggered local arms races by influencing neighbouring clans and 
tribes to also acquire SALW. Historically, it has been easier for people to acquire SALW 
from state stockpiles, whether through theft or otherwise, than it is to smuggle them from 
outside PNG. Much of the leakage of SALW from state stockpiles has historically been 
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facilitated by dilapidated infrastructure housing them and the poor management of these 
stockpiles, which preceded the reform of stockpile management in the likes of the 
PNGDF.
66
 The most common leakage from state stockpiles has come in the form of 
individual thefts of single weapons, although large scale thefts have occurred. Of the SLR 
and M16 assault rifles that had been sold to PNG following independence, the 2004 audit 
found that there was a seventy four per cent attrition rate, a significant proportion of which 
had been stolen.
67
 This stream of SALW leaking from PNGDF stockpiles has slowed 
considerably following an Australian-assisted programme of reform of PNG armouries in 
the mid-2000s. Capie stated in 2011 that current estimates were that the PNGDF were 
missing three hundred weapons from its stockpile.
68
 Despite the success of the PNGDF at 
bolstering its armoury security, the RPNGC continues to leak SALW from its numerous 
police stations across the country.
69
 In 2001, the RPNGC conducted an audit that 
concluded that up to six hundred firearms were unaccounted for, yet three years later the 
deputy commissioner conceded that it could be much higher. In 2004 it was settled upon 
that the RPNGC had 4,800 firearms on their books with 1,440 having leaked from their 
stockpiles.
70
 The RPNGC has also been known to leak firearms that they have seized as 
part of their duties, often for a profit. In addition to the PNGDF and RPNGC, the heavily-
armed PNG Correctional Services have also been known to leak SALW.
71
 It has been 
claimed in a 2008 report from ABC News that “Over the years, PNG’s armoury has been 
plundered to such an extent, no one really knows how many guns are in criminal hands.”72  
Following the end of the decade-long conflict in Bougainville, a large number of 
illicit SALW that were stockpiled during the conflict remain in circulation on the island 
and have also been smuggled to other areas like SHP, despite an extensive disarmament 
process.
73
 This conflict was reported as claiming between twelve and fifteen thousand lives 
during the civil war as a result of direct combat deaths, executions and ‘disappearances’, 
and indirect illness and injury as a result of the conflict; however there has been some 
dispute over the precise numbers.
74
 This conflict also had a number of other significant 
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impacts, including the collapse of the island’s health system, destruction of infrastructure, 
loss of education and training and substantial economic and social damage.
75
 The conflict 
also drove out the gold and copper mine operators and the other services they employ, 
which was the major pre-conflict employer in Bougainville, and also destroyed much of 
the cocoa and copra industries.
76
 This all served to severely impact the level of post-
conflict economic activity in Bougainville, which has had a substantial impact on residents 
living in the province in the years after the war. There has been limited progress made in 
the post-conflict disarmament programme in Bougainville which has contributed to the 
continuing presence of SALW. The continuing presence of SALW remains a major issue 
in Bougainville, with the Director of the National Coordination Office for Bougainville 
Affairs saying that “I believe we have more guns on the island than when we signed [the 
peace agreement] in 2001.”77 It has been reported by the UNDP in 2008 that there were at 
least three thousand SALW remaining on the island that were used by combatants in the 
conflict and left out of the peace process.
78
 The continuing presence of significant 
quantities of illicit SALW in Bougainville has contributed to the growth of internal SALW 
trafficking in PNG, with one civil society group director stating that “We also see that guns 
are being traded between Bougainville and other parts of Papua New Guinea and across 
borders. People from the Highlands often come here to buy guns”.79  
While it is often rumoured that large scale cross-border smuggling of SALW into 
PNG is occurring, the available evidence suggests that this is greatly exaggerated and that 
smuggling is small and infrequent. Many of these rumours have focused upon a large-scale 
‘guns-for-drugs’ trade across the Torres Strait separating PNG and Australia. Capie stated 
in 2003 that “while there is agreement that the trade exists and consensus about the general 
area where smuggling takes place, there are major differences of opinion about the scale 
and sophistication of the operations.”80 As a result of these rumours, the AFP joined with 
the RPNGC to investigate the validity of these rumours, concluding that a small number of 
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guns were found to have crossed the Torres Strait over eight years.
81
 There are small-scale 
instances of the exchange of guns for drugs across the Torres Strait, involving the transfer 
of small quantities of the likes of handguns, rifles and shotguns.
82
 There have also been 
substantial rumours surrounding alleged arms trafficking across the border separating PNG 
and West Papua, with the absence of monitoring of the border by PNG meaning that the 
best conclusion surrounding these claims has been that only small amounts of arms are 
smuggled across the border.
83
 This was reinforced by Capie when he stated in 2003 that 
“The consensus opinion in PNG is that while transborder shipments take place between 
PNG and Indonesia, they are not in sizeable quantities.”84 Despite this, claims surrounding 
the trafficking of SALW across this border still arise. One such instance of this occurred in 
March 2012 when PNG Customs claimed that there are SALW illegally entering PNG 
from Indonesia at five points on their shared border, which were then transported to SHP.
85
 
There have also been claims that foreign logging companies have been bringing arms into 
PNG on board their vessels but the lack of monitoring of their activities have prevented 
verification of these claims.
86
 
Homemade weapons are relatively common throughout PNG, with a report in 2011 
stating that the spread of homemade weapons in PNG is ‘out of control’, according to local 
NGOs. The Pacific Small Arms Action Group has stated that there is an abundance of the 
parts required for these homemade weapons in PNG, particularly in the Southern 
Highlands.
87
  The importance of these weapons when compared to factory-made firearms 
is greatly reduced by issues such as the threat they pose to the user, inaccuracy and 
reliability, with factory-made firearms being favoured by citizens in PNG. While these 
weapons have been located throughout PNG, Alpers and Twyford have stated that 
“Though it is difficult to pinpoint the main centres of production or volumes being 
produced, the Highlands have in the past been a centre of both demand and supply.”88  
While the numbers of small arms in illicit possession in Papua New Guinea are 
small when compared to those in many other parts of the world, they are still found in 
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substantial quantities in parts of PNG. There have been varying estimates as to the precise 
number of illicit firearms in illicit possession in PNG. It was reported in 2008 that the 
extent of the leakage of SALW from PNG armouries was so great that no one could 
accurately establish just how many were in civilian possession throughout PNG.
89
  Despite 
this, a 2011 report highlighted the contribution of firearms to the formation of what has 
been called a ‘national gun culture’ in the country, with one politician estimating that 
“Every household now owns a gun illegally… Some of the most modern weapons fetch 
$US500-1000. It’s a lucrative business”.90 Much of the scholarship on illicit firearms over 
the past few years has focused on Southern Highlands Province (SHP), where there are 
large numbers of guns when compared with the rest of PNG, and also Port Moresby to a 
lesser extent. In a 2008 study, substantial concentrations of illicit SALW were found in the 
Southern Highlands Province of PNG. SHP was found to contain the highest levels of 
firearm possession in PNG, with estimates of 2,450 factory-made SALW being held in 
SHP with five hundred to a thousand of these being assault rifles.
91
 In Haley and Muggah’s 
2005 survey of residents of SHP and NCD districts on their perceptions of arms and armed 
violence, it found that most SHP residents surveyed felt that the number of firearms there 
was stable or rising while in NCD nearly three quarters felt that they were stable or rising 
and a third felt that they were decreasing.
92
 Interviews conducted by Alpers with SHP 
residents tallied a total of 120 M16s and 58 SLRs that were witnessed by these subjects, 
which contributed to estimates of between 150 and 350 and 10 and 150 respectively of 
these illicit weapons being present in SHP at the time.
93
 It is also estimated that there were 
between 15 and 25 AK-47 and variant models present in SHP, but the limited ammunition 
available significantly inhibited their acquisition and use.
94
 There have also been found to 
be small numbers of various other rifles in SHP, including Singaporean, German, Israeli, 
British and French made weapons, and rifles from the Second World War. Perhaps the 
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most prevalent weapon present in SHP is the 12-gauge shotgun, with the PNGDF reporting 
180 missing following their 2004 national audit and the RPNGC also have acknowledged 
that they are missing a large amount from their national stocks.
95
 It has been estimated that 
more than one hundred illicit machine guns of assorted type are loose in SHP, but their use 
has been limited by ammunition shortages, the mountings they require and the varying 
states of disrepair that they are in.
96
 The handgun is among the least common type of 
weapon witnessed in SHP, as they are said to be largely held by local prominent figures. In 
addition to these commercial small arms, there have also been found to be significant 
stocks of home-made firearms with local claims that there is “one for every man”.97 The 
survey in SHP found that the most-sighted weapons were factory-made shotguns, 
M16/AR15s, hand guns, pump action shotguns and SLRs respectively. This compares to 
NCD, where factory-made shotguns, handguns, pump-action shotguns, M16/AR15s and 
SLRs were most-sighted respectively.
98
 This suggests that illicit SALW are a prominent 
feature within many communities throughout PNG, especially those in SHP. 
  
Forms of armed violence prevalent in Papua New Guinea 
  
Inter-group fighting 
 Much of the armed violence that occurs in PNG centres upon tribal fighting which 
is most prevalent in the Highlands provinces. Tribal fighting has formed a significant part 
of PNG society for centuries and prior to the late 1980s and early ‘90s was dominated by 
traditional weapons like bows and arrows. The first reports of the use of firearms in tribal 
fighting arose in 1987, with their use taking off from around 1992 when firearms began to 
flow into these regions. This altered the dynamics of traditional tribal fighting, because 
these traditional weapons had low levels of mortality but with the introduction of firearms 
the lethality of inter-group fighting increased considerably. Alpers has stated that while the 
numbers of SALW in PNG are small in comparison with other countries, the key 
difference is that the primary reason for acquiring a firearm in PNG is the intent to use it to 
harm another person.
99
 It was highlighted in 2008 that, when compared to countries such as 
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Ecuador, Jamaica, Colombia and South Africa which also experience high levels of firearm 
violence, illicit factory-made firearms in the Southern Highlands were two to five times 
more likely to be used for the purpose of murder.
100
 Alpers stated that “It is perhaps the 
intensity of their misuse of each firearm, rather than the raw number of guns available, that 
is the Highlanders’ point of difference.”101 The important role now played by firearms in 
traditional tribal fighting has meant that firearms possessed by tribes are accorded high 
status, with significant protection given to the weapon and the tribesman in possession of 
it. Gathering precise data pertaining to deaths from armed violence in parts of PNG, 
particularly Southern Highlands Province, is extremely difficult as it has previously been 
estimated that up to an estimated 98% of deaths in SHP are not reported.
102
 Alpers and 
Twyford stated that it was estimated in a 1997 report that two hundred people were killed 
each year over a five year period as a result of tribal fighting in the Highlands.
103
 One of 
the few investigations into death and injury from firearms was conducted by a surgeon at 
the only hospital in SHP, covering the first five years of the 1990s. It revealed that from 
1990-92 there were no patients requiring treatment for gunshot wounds at Mendi hospital 
as a result of tribal fighting, but in 1993 (when guns first began to flow into SHP) this 
figure increased to eighteen per cent of admissions and increased again to thirty three per 
cent in 1994.
104
 Another study in 2003 revealed that the rate of firearm-related hospital 
admissions in SHP was 9.06 per 100,000 people, compared to a figure of 2.51 per 100,000 
in Australia.
105
 When Haley and Muggah surveyed households in SHP and NCD prior to 
the 2005 National Gun Summit, it found that eighteen per cent of households of NCD, 
which traditionally has not been thought to experience tribal fighting, had been victims of 
tribal clashes and a further twenty seven per cent contained at least one member who had 
participated in tribal fighting.
106
 Firearms in SHP have served to inflame tribal fighting, 
with perhaps the most prominent example being the Ujamap-Wogia tribal war that lasted 
three years and killed over one hundred people, ending in 2003.
107
 While there is little 
doubt that armed violence in PNG is at significant levels, there are also issues with the 
armed violence data that is available. This primarily centres upon whether the instances of 
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tribal fighting and the deaths it results in has improved or worsened. There have been many 
conflicting reports stating that it is getting worse and alternately getting better.
108
 This 
shows that while the armed violence threat is clear, the precise extent of inter-group 
fighting remains unclear. Tribal fighting has been a large part of PNG society for many 
years, particularly in the SHP province, and the presence of SALW has served to 
significantly increase the lethality of this fighting and the costs imposed upon residents of 
these PNG communities. 
  
Crime – homicide, robbery, assault, sexual violence 
 Firearms also feature prominently in the commission of crime in PNG.  In a similar 
vein to death and injury records in SHP, accurate statistics for firearm-related crime in 
PNG is also hard to come by because of disparities in record-keeping between urban 
centres and rural areas. Additionally, compiling statistics on violent crime is made more 
difficult by the fact that record-keeping for crime statistics do not include the type of 
weapon used. When ‘firearms offences’ are recorded, they include only crimes that fall 
within the bounds of the Firearms Act, so do not include the likes of robbery and 
homicide.
109
 In spite of this, it was reported in 2012 that SALW are used in over sixty per 
cent of ‘major crimes’, including the likes of homicide, armed robbery and domestic 
violence.
110
 This report found that the murder rate in Port Moresby equates to 54 murders 
per 100,000 people, out of its population of 450,000, which compares to the global murder 
rate of 7 per 100,000 people.
111
 Research from SHP suggests that there is a firearms 
victimisation rate of 23% of households in the province. Additionally, a 2004 study on 
violent crime in PNG found that violent crime occurred at a rate of 2,000 instances per 
100,000 people, which was ten-fold higher than the rate found in Australia.
112
 In 2003, the 
UN found that, when PNG is compared to other countries, the urban centres of Port 
Moresby, Lae and Goroka experienced violent crime rates twice that of Johannesburg and 
Rio de Janeiro, and Port Moresby itself had four times as much violent crime as Manila in 
the Philippines.
113
 The 2005 armed violence assessment found that armed assault and 
armed robbery were two of the most commonly experienced violent crimes by residents in 
SHP and NCD, with 13% and 8% of SHP residents experiencing armed assault and armed 
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robbery respectively and 12% and 15% respectively in NCP.
114
 When surveying the 
experiences of residents in relation to murder and attempted murder in 2005, it was found 
that in SHP the western region of Hela had the highest experiences of murder and 
attempted murder with 7% and 15% respectively experiencing it, compared to 3% and 1% 
of residents in eastern SHP.
115
 The rates of murder and attempted murder experienced in 
NCD were at similar levels to those in the east of SHP. Instances of sexual violence also 
frequently feature firearms, carried out both by other citizens and the police themselves. 
Firearms have historically been found to serve to exacerbate crimes against women and 
children, with Alpers stating that “In particular, violence perpetrated with firearms 
commonly causes more severe injury, exerts a disproportionate effect on women and 
children, exacerbates unequal power relationships between the sexes, and highlights the 
damaging effects of linking guns with masculinity.”116 In 2008, the UNDP stated that, 
outside of armed conflict, the most non-conflict armed violence occurred in the home and 
local community with domestic violence being among the most common.
117
 In the early to 
mid-2000s, some reports recorded that crime rates fluctuated throughout the period. 
Overall crime rates were found to have decreased between 2000 and 2004, while murder 
rates decreased through 2006 and 2007 before rising again in 2008.
118
 This shows that 
despite much of the focus on perceived increasing violent crime, data suggests that over 
certain periods the opposite may have been occurring.  PNG experiences significant rates 
of violent crime; this violent crime is further exacerbated by the proliferation of SALW 
throughout PNG, particularly in the commission of crimes like assault, robbery and sexual 
violence. 
  
Political violence 
 Coinciding with the growing spread of SALW over the last three decades, guns and 
politics have been seen to be increasingly intertwined. Historically, violence in PNG has 
increased during election periods, particularly in rural areas. Election intimidation 
                                                          
114
 Haley, N. & Muggah, R., "Jumping the Gun? Reflections on Armed Violence in Papua New Guinea", p. 
45 
115
 Ibid 
116
 Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern 
Highlands", p. 91 
117
 United Nations Development Programme, "Armed Violence in Asia and the Pacific: An Overview of the 
Causes, Costs and Consequences", 2008 http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/regional-
publications/Causes-Costs-and-Consequences-Armed-Violence-Asia-Pacific.pdf, (accessed 15 July 2012), p. 
14 
118
 Capie, D., "Small Arms, Violence and Gender in Papua New Guinea: Towards a Research Agenda", p. 45 
25 
 
involving SALW has been reported since the 1992 elections, with threats and violence 
being committed at polling stations. This electoral violence in PNG has also included 
candidates being kidnapped at gunpoint by supporters of rival candidates and threats 
against state officials that run elections, including one threat made by an SHP civil servant 
to shoot down any government helicopters seen in the area during the election period.
119
 
Guns have been used by supporters of candidates to gain access to voting papers and other 
electoral infrastructure in order to tamper with results. PNGDF soldiers have also been 
found to have assisted electoral candidates in contravention of electoral laws, including 
being linked to raids on ballot boxes.
120
 When discussing electoral violence in SHP, Alpers 
has stated that “By the time of the 2002 national election, firearms and the willingness to 
use them were firmly enmeshed in the politics of the province.”121 Elections in PNG not 
only involve electoral intimidation with guns, but also successful electoral candidates have 
been found to supply small arms to their electorates and tribes. Similarly, candidates in 
elections have been found to build their own arms stockpiles in the lead up to an election, 
in order to arm their supporters.
122
 One example of this stockpiling of weapons occurred 
during the 2012 national election, when a candidate for election in the Western Highlands 
was arrested after being found to have a stockpile of weapons and ammunition at his 
house.
123
 This electoral violence was prominent during the 2002 national election, which 
resulted in the deaths of thirty people, a significant proportion of which were by firearms. 
After conducting a review of the 2002 election, a Commonwealth Expert Group 
highlighted substantial voter intimidation, a widespread gun culture and a fearful 
atmosphere, and they recommended that future elections would require a large security 
presence.
124
 SALW have served to inflame existing problems in the PNG electoral system, 
with Alpers stating that “Small arms, as always, were not the cause of this lethal violence, 
merely its enabler.”125 This violence during elections discourages PNG citizens from 
voting for fear for their safety. Democracy in PNG is afflicted by an underlying culture of 
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violence throughout much of the country during election time; this means that a great deal 
of campaigning is carried out at the barrel of a gun.  
 It is in this way that the issues of SALW and armed violence in PNG have been 
made apparent. This chapter has illustrated the role of PNG in the global legal SALW trade 
with the quantities being transferred and some of the types involved, the illicit SALW trade 
in PNG including the sources of weapons and some of the quantities involved, and finally 
their use in the likes of inter-group fighting, other violent crime and political violence. This 
has highlighted the context within which the evaluation of the SALW and armed violence 
responses within PNG will take place in the next section, examining measures at the 
national, regional and international levels.  
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Chapter Four – Policy responses to armed violence in Papua New Guinea 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the proliferation of SALW and their use in 
armed violence is a significant problem that has been affecting communities in PNG for a 
number of years. In this time there have been many policy initiatives adopted to reduce the 
numbers of SALW in circulation throughout the country and reduce the armed violence 
that frequently accompanies their presence. This chapter will analyse these measures that 
have been adopted by PNG, which have taken place at the national, regional and 
international level. In order to achieve this, the policies will be examined and their 
objectives will be outlined along with how effective they have proven to be at addressing 
the proliferation of SALW and armed violence throughout PNG.      
 
National measures 
  
This section will analyse the national measures that have been implemented in PNG 
to try and address the proliferation of SALW and the armed violence they contribute to. It 
will examine measures that have been implemented by the state and its various 
subsidiaries. The specific initiatives that this section will be analysing include the Firearms 
Act, the National Gun Summit and Guns Control Committee, the PNGDF reform process 
and the Bougainville Peace Process. 
  
PNG Firearms Act 1978  
 The major piece of legislation that makes up the firearms law in PNG is the 
Firearms Act 1978. The Firearms Act covers a large number of areas related to SALW. 
One of the major principles underlying the Firearms Act is that, unlike in a number of 
other states, citizens of PNG are not guaranteed the right to own firearms under the law. 
The Firearms Act gives the PNG Police Commissioner the role of registrar and the 
responsibility for enforcement of the law.
126
 Restrictions or prohibitions on types of 
firearms and areas that they may be held or used in can be put under a moratorium at any 
time and for any length of time. Additionally, new licences and permits for types of 
firearms can be put under moratorium at any time and for any length of time. For example, 
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a moratorium was placed on new firearms licences for shotguns, pistols and high-powered 
firearms in 2000.
127
 Possession of a firearm in PNG requires a firearms licence, and the 
Firearms Act outlaws possession without one, punishable by fine or short imprisonment.
128
 
In order to obtain a firearm licence, there is a ‘genuine reason’ standard within the Act that 
applicants must meet in order to be approved, and PNG is one of the few Pacific states that 
include self-defence within this clause.
129
 This ‘genuine reason’ standard includes use in 
gun clubs, defence of life and property, underwater hunting, veterinary purposes, scientific 
research, hunting for business, culling of stock, sports, subsistence hunting and any other 
reason that may receive approval from the Registrar. The ownership and/or possession of a 
pistol or high-powered firearm requires its own special licence, as the possession of these 
without this special licence is outlawed by the Act.
130
 When firearms licences are issued, 
the details of those who are issued with one are entered into a national register. The 
accuracy of the firearms register in PNG is undermined by insufficient resources to enable 
police outside of Port Moresby to regularly ensure that their records are accurate or to send 
their records on to headquarters.
131
 In a 2003 analysis, Capie concluded that “It also seems 
likely that remote police stations have difficulties keeping registrations up to date and 
reporting information to Port Moresby.”132 Those licenced firearms holders are required to 
ensure that their weapons are stored securely. While the Firearms Act does not specify how 
and where firearms should be stored, it requires licence holders to take ‘all reasonable 
steps’ when it comes to safe firearms storage.133 In addition to licencing for the possession 
of firearms, a licence is also required for the sale of firearms and their ammunition.
134
 
Permits are also required to be held prior to the purchase of a firearm and when carrying 
one.
135
 The manufacture of firearms is an outlawed industry in PNG.
136
 Import and export 
controls in PNG are minimal, with no export controls at all and the only import control 
being a requirement for the approval of the Police Commissioner for arms imports.
137
 The 
Act outlaws the illicit transfer of firearms. There is also a blanket ban placed upon the use 
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and possession of machine guns.
138
 It is these aspects that make up the body of the 
Firearms Act 1978 and the government’s attempts to control firearms possession and their 
spread in PNG. 
 There has been considerable analysis of the Firearms Act 1978 and its effectiveness 
in addressing SALW and gun crimes. Alpers and Twyford lauded the Firearms Act in 
2003, stating that the firearms legislation in PNG is among the most comprehensive in the 
region. They went on to say that “it is one of the few developing states in the Pacific to 
have extensively revised and adapted its small arms legislation in recent years.”139 Alpers 
also noted the comprehensiveness of the Firearms Act when he referred to a UN 
comparison of gun law throughout the Pacific, which found that PNG’s legislation more 
closely matched the global standard for SALW legislation than any of its neighbours in the 
region.
140
 Despite the apparent comprehensiveness of the Firearms Act in PNG, its 
effectiveness has been limited by regular breaches of the law and calls for it to be 
strengthened in the face of continuing high levels of illicit firearms and armed violence. 
One such notable breach of the Firearms Act occurred in late 2009 when the PNG Customs 
service seized four assault rifles and a pistol from a man entering the country at the airport 
in Port Moresby, on suspicions relating to the documentation he had for the weapons.
141
 
The documentation stated that he was bringing the weapons into the country for a licenced 
dealer, however records held by Customs claimed that he was no longer in the employment 
of this dealer, despite having since been rehired. The major dispute related to ownership of 
the weapons and whether they had been transported in for the state as had been suggested, 
or whether they belonged to the licenced dealer or the agent of the dealer. The import 
permit that was among the documentation in their possession had been approved and 
signed by the Police Commissioner, with the disputed ownership of the weapons and the 
position of the person holding them raising issues around the legitimacy of the import 
permit and its issuance.
142
 In addition to these questions, PNG law also requires an import 
permit to be signed by the head of the Customs Service, but in this case it had not been.
143
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This event has raised significant questions as to the enforcement of laws relating to SALW 
transfers and the like in PNG, transfers involving both arms dealers and the state.  
As noted earlier, there are regular calls for strengthening of the Firearms Act 
despite it being rated as relatively strong. One such example of this was a call from the 
head of the Guns Control Committee, which was established to recommend measures to 
address the SALW problem in PNG, who stated in 2008 that PNG firearms law needed to 
be bolstered, particularly around the firearms registry and the ability to track who owns 
guns, in order to try and stem the spread of SALW and their use in violent crime.
144
 In 
addition to this, the PM called for the amendment of the Firearms Act in 2005 to include 
mandatory sentences for gun crime and limiting firearm possession to disciplined forces, in 
order to fight SALW and violent crime.
145
 Because of this relative comprehensiveness of 
the Firearms Act, the ineffectiveness of it in addressing illicit SALW and armed violence 
has frequently been attributed to weak enforcement of the law. In highlighting the 
difficulties PNG faces in improving the efficacy of its SALW legislation around reducing 
SALW levels and armed violence, Alpers has previously stated that no matter how much 
money is spent on the issue or how many new laws are passed, armed violence will 
continue unabated if citizens have little faith in the laws or justice system of PNG that are 
responsible for the enforcement of laws like the Firearms Act.
146
 This is highlighted when 
Alpers stated that “As numerous commentators have remarked in a myriad of reports 
spanning several decades, before any meaningful improvement to human security for its 
citizens can occur, the Government of PNG must first reform the law and justice sector, 
and regain the trust of those who have turned to guns.”147  
It is in this way that the Firearms Act 1978 was designed and implemented to 
regulate firearms possession and trade in PNG in order to restrict the proliferation of 
SALW into the illicit market and their use in armed violence. It has been concluded by 
many that, while it is amongst the most strict legislation in the region, it suffers from weak 
implementation and has therefore only had limited effectiveness at addressing SALW and 
armed violence. It is these issues surrounding the weak implementation of the Firearms Act 
that highlight one of the major issues that exacerbates SALW proliferation and armed 
                                                          
144
 ABC Radio Australia, "Calls for Tougher PNG Gun Control Laws", ABC Radio Australia, 2008, 
http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/2008-10-09/calls-for-tougher-png-gun-control-laws/33816  
145
 Bonsella, Bonney., "Papua New Guinea Premier Moots Tougher Gun Laws", The National, 2005, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/? 
146
 Alpers, P., "Gun-Running in Papua New Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Southern 
Highlands", p. 111 
147
 Ibid 
31 
 
violence in PNG, and thus reflects much of the dysfunction within the law and order and 
justice sectors in the country. Much of this dysfunction is based on lack of resources and 
also stems from the culture of the police force, where corruption and other such issues are 
chronic.  
  
Guns Control Committee and the National Gun Summit 
 The Guns Control Committee was established in 2005 as part of a review of 
firearms legislation and other controls initiated by the government, with the task of 
investigating and addressing the SALW problem in PNG and recommending measures to 
address this. In conjunction with this, a National Gun Summit was also held later in 2005 
following a national road-show that travelled around the country talking with local 
populations about SALW problems and other issues relating to the gun culture.
148
 The 
Guns Control Committee was instructed to specifically focus on areas including the role of 
the Firearms Act, jurisdictional issues and the judiciary’s role in sentencing and monitoring 
and enforcement of the Firearms Act.
149
 Following the Summit, a report was compiled 
which included a number of recommendations for the government to implement. The 
major recommendation was the establishment of a centralised body with the task of finding 
a way to address the issue of SALW in PNG that involved a whole-of-government 
approach across a number of sectors, in order to fill a void in the current efforts at 
addressing SALW.
150
 Another central recommendation was a national gun buyback or 
amnesty programme. In addition to this recommendation, a province-wide gun amnesty 
was proposed in SHP following the Gun Summit in order to get citizens there to surrender 
their illegal firearms, with a request for cooperation from the national government.
151
 This 
approach was criticised as ignoring the opinion of groups and communities that are closely 
involved with and affected by the problem of SALW, as well as academic work that has 
found that such programmes do not form a part of effective strategies at addressing 
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SALW.
152
 Another shortcoming of gun amnesties or buybacks in PNG, and the Southern 
Highlands in particular, is that the firearms that locals hand in are generally only 
homemade weapons, while they retain their better, factory-made weapons.
153
 Despite the 
criticism of a number of the recommendations made, following the Summit the 
government committed to ensuring that the recommendations made would be 
implemented. To this effect, Internal Security Minister Bire Kimisopa stated in 2005 that 
“I have a simple job to do and that is to implement the recommendations of the Guns 
Control Committee. It will get the full support it deserves”.154 In 2007, two years after the 
Summit, the head of the Guns Control Committee, Major General (ret’d) Jerry Singirok, 
claimed that its report was being ignored by the government and that the number of SALW 
present in PNG had increased and had been causing more harm in the years since the 
Summit.
155
 The GCC report on the Summit took nearly four years to be introduced to the 
PNG parliament, eventually being tabled in August of 2009, despite being submitted to the 
PM in September 2005. Despite the Somare government’s acceptance of the report along 
with the recommendations it made, nothing had been done to implement any of its 
recommendations or findings by the time it was tabled in parliament in 2009.
156
 Three 
years later, in 2012, it was reported that none of the recommendations made in the 
Committee’s report had been implemented.157 In evaluating the impact of both the Guns 
Control Committee and the National Gun Summit, the UNDP has concluded that they have 
been largely ineffective, saying that “while these two initiatives have generated significant 
levels of public support for addressing armed violence, both processes have fallen short in 
producing any significant follow-up action.”158 Despite the lofty rhetoric that came from 
the PNG government during and after the Gun Summit, they appear to have little appetite 
for undertaking major changes in order to address SALW problems in PNG. It is because 
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of these issues that it has largely been ineffective at addressing SALW and armed violence 
issues in PNG. 
  
PNGDF reform process 
 As a result of the steady leakage of SALW from the armouries of the PNGDF, a 
reform programme was launched to overhaul both the forces and stockpiles of the PNGDF. 
Following the 2002 audit of PNGDF armouries, which was carried out in conjunction with 
the Australian Defence Force, the large-scale theft of SALW from defence force stockpiles 
was revealed. As a result of this, a programme of surplus weapons destruction was 
launched. This programme involved the destruction of around four thousand SALW and 
related items, which were mainly firearms, ammunition and explosives that were no longer 
in serviceable condition or had exceeded their use-by date.
159
 This surplus weapons 
destruction programme received no opposition, with positive media coverage afforded to it 
by news media. In addition to this targeting of surplus weapons, the PNGDF also 
undertook a programme of rationalisation in order to downsize its forces and increase 
efficiency. This process began with the publishing of the Defence White Paper in 1999, 
which stated the need for significant reform of the PNGDF and recommended “a 
significant reduction in the overall size of our forces but an increase in their combat power 
and effectiveness.”160 The White Paper made limited mention of reducing PNGDF 
weapons holdings, or SALW at all, with the only mention of it being the need for 
standardisation of weapons systems used by the defence force. Despite this limited 
reference, it was generally accepted by those involved in the reform process that surplus 
weapon destruction had to form an integral part of the process.
161
As part of this 
rationalisation process, the PNG government commissioned the Commonwealth 
Secretariat to advise on the reform process, which resulted in the publication of a report 
from their Eminent Persons Group entitled ‘Review of the Papua New Guinea Defence 
Force’. This report proved highly controversial in PNG, with the most contentious aspect 
of it being the reduction in size of the PNGDF to 1,900, a loss of 4,400 soldiers.
162
 
Opposition to the report escalated to include a raid on a PNGDF armoury by around one 
hundred soldiers who stole significant quantities of M16 assault rifles and ammunition and 
occupied their barracks until the government agreed to their demands and reneged on the 
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report’s recommendations. One of the major reasons cited for the failure of this programme 
was that it was associated with external powers (in the form of the Commonwealth 
Secretariat) which raised significant concerns around foreign interference throughout PNG 
and raised the spectre of historic colonialism.
163
  
While this strategy failed, soon after another reform programme was initiated and 
led by the PNGDF itself which faced much less opposition. This home-grown process 
spanned a five year period during which the PNGDF shed more than 4,000 of its staff in 
two phases, with financial and practical assistance from Australia, free from 
controversy.
164
 The PNGDF faced another major controversy as part of its reform process, 
when they proceeded with down-sizing arms stockpiles in order to eliminate the many 
different weapons systems and differing quantities of each variant, so as to bring PNGDF 
weapons systems into line with their regional partners. This involved a dramatic reduction 
in weapons systems, from 5,700 weapons within 58 weapons systems to 2,300 weapons 
within 11 weapons systems with the surplus being destroyed, sold or otherwise 
eliminated.
165
 In much the same vein as the Commonwealth Secretariat report, there was 
instant anger at this decision with allegations of foreign interference once again made and 
claims of disarmament of the PNGDF. This time public opposition did not derail the 
reform process, with the programme being completed on schedule and achieving its targets 
by 2006, resulting in a soldier to weapon ratio of 1:1.
166
 The rationalisation of the PNGDF 
has helped to stymie the leakage of SALW into the illicit trade particularly from their own 
stockpiles, by improving the security and management of them and increasing the 
efficiency of forces within the military.
167
 Leakage of SALW from the state has by no 
means ceased though, with substantial numbers of SALW from RPNGC armouries leaking 
into the illicit market or otherwise being used illegally
168
. Additionally, there remain 
substantial numbers of SALW in circulation throughout PNG, and these SALW remain in 
communities for long periods of time and change hands often. This rationalisation has 
meant that in addition to the flow of small arms into illicit possession being significantly 
reduced, the PNGDF is also now more effective at managing the stock it still maintains in 
order to prevent the losses seen in the past. Despite this, in February 2012 the PNG 
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government announced its intention to increase the size of the PNGDF from a 1,900-strong 
force to 10,000 soldiers in addition to the purchase of new weapons, aircraft and naval 
vessels. If such a rapid, large-scale build-up of the PNGDF were to occur then this may 
again raise questions around the defence force’s capability around ensuring the discipline 
of its forces and the security of its stockpiles, with the risk of a return to the previously-
experienced leakage of SALW possible. 
 
Bougainville Peace Agreement 
As part of the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement, a weapons disposal plan was a 
key element. This aspect of the peace negotiations proved to be one of the most sensitive, 
and was one of the last issues to be resolved. The weapons disposal programme within the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement was linked to a process towards greater autonomy for 
Bougainville and a referendum on full independence.
169
 This proceeded in a three step 
process. The first step involved the collection of weapons from each of the combatant 
groups by their leaders and were put into sealed container storage by the UN mission in 
Bougainville. The second step in this process involved these containers being stored in 
central locations while the proposed constitutional amendments were passed upon 
verification that enough of these weapons had been collected. For the third step, 
discussions were to be held following the autonomy legislation coming into force in order 
to determine how the collected weapons would be dealt with and to determine whether 
there had been sufficient numbers collected for elections to be held. The referendum on 
Bougainville independence would then be held between ten and fifteen years after these 
elections.
170
  
The constitutional amendments necessary for stage two of this process were passed 
in March 2002, with the collection of weapons continuing through this.
171
 In January 2013 
John Momis, the Bougainville president, confirmed that the referendum on independence 
would be held by 2020.
172
 When this announcement was made, he warned that there are 
still issues around weapons disposal and good governance practices that need to be 
addressed to ensure Bougainville gets a desirable outcome.
173
 When evaluating the impact 
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of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, Maze and Issar have stated that “the first phases of 
implementation of the Bougainville Peace Agreement were met with success, but the 
situation in the south has since been deteriorating and the number of weapons that remain 
in circulation is unknown.”174 Instances of civil war-era weapons being stored in old 
bunkers from the Second World War and subsequently being retrieved and then sold to 
rebel groups have been confirmed, which has contributed to a possible new arms build-up 
in the region.
175
 This has been contributed to by reported statements from residents in 2009 
that said that firearms possession amongst young people was at high levels and that trading 
of arms had been taking place between citizens in Bougainville.
176
  
It is in this way that, while the Bougainville government has made progress on 
carrying out many of the requirements set out in the Bougainville Peace Agreement like 
the constitutional amendments and referendum date aspects, there have been mixed results 
in fulfilling the weapons disposal element and reducing the numbers of SALW present in 
the province more generally. This weapons disposal element of the peace agreement has 
focused solely on addressing the supply of SALW in Bougainville and, as has been shown, 
in recent years there has been growing concern around the increasing levels of SALW 
possession as well as a growing trade in them both within and outside the province despite 
the collection of large numbers of these weapons in the aftermath of the civil war. 
These measures can be viewed as being effective at addressing part of the supply 
side of the SALW problem in PNG. While this has experienced some success, it can be 
seen as an indirect measure at addressing the SALW problem itself and only covers part of 
the problem. In order to truly effective, addressing the SALW problem in PNG requires 
action that is aimed at both the supply and demand sides. This need for demand side action 
is also addressed further in the next chapter. 
 
Regional measures 
This section of the chapter takes a regional level approach to examining what 
activities have been carried out between states of the Pacific to address SALW and related 
issues in the region. This will focus upon measures initiated through the Pacific Islands 
Forum. The four agreements that will be analysed are the Honiara Declaration, Aitutaki 
Declaration, Biketawa Declaration and the Nadi Framework. This section will examine 
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what these individual agreements all seek to address and how, when they are viewed 
collectively, they have contributed to efforts at addressing SALW and armed violence 
issues in PNG. 
 
Honiara Declaration 
 The catalyst for the Honiara Declaration came during the 1991 meeting of the then-
South Pacific Forum (now PIF), when the threat posed by transnational crime to the region 
was raised. Because of this threat, action was deemed necessary in order to protect the 
‘sovereignty, security and economic integrity’ of Forum members and also to prevent the 
undermining of development in the region.
177
 The Honiara Declaration placed particular 
emphasis upon financial crime and drug trafficking, along with law enforcement measures 
to protect against such crime.
178
 The Honiara Declaration set out a number of areas to be 
focused on in order to achieve this enhanced law enforcement cooperation. These included 
suspect apprehension, evidence collection, witness management, greater asset seizure 
ability between countries and prevention of money laundering where banking regulation is 
weak, uniform extradition legislation across the region, a regional customs body, a greater 
role in regional policing for the SPCPC, regional and international cooperation between 
police, customs and the Forum Secretariat to combat drug trafficking and greater 
centralised coordination of state law enforcement training needs.
179
 The Honiara 
Declaration for improved regional law enforcement should have contributed to the 
prevention of SALW trafficking by creating a region-wide framework for the prevention of 
transnational crime and criminal networks, and ensure that law enforcement agencies 
across the region can adequately address these.  
Despite this, Peebles has stated that the Honiara Declaration was an advance in 
regional security integration that Forum members were not yet ready to wholeheartedly 
accept. He goes on to say that, “Implementing the Honiara Declaration proved 
problematic. Successive Forum Communiqués noted the lack of progress in implementing 
the Honiara Declaration and stressed its importance.”180 The Honiara Declaration was the 
first tentative step for the countries of the Pacific Islands Forum towards a common 
regional framework on security matters. While there has been little progress towards 
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implementation of its recommendations, it demonstrated a willingness on the part of the 
states in the region to take a regional approach to problems afflicting states therein. 
  
Aitutaki Declaration 
 Following on from the Honiara Declaration came the creation of the Aitutaki 
Declaration in 1997, which sought to establish how Forum members could cooperate 
around regional security. The Aitutaki Declaration was made at a time when the Pacific 
Islands Forum had been found to be largely toothless when it came to addressing civil 
conflict in the region, after it had stayed out of the Bougainville conflict which had 
affected both PNG and the Solomon Islands.
181
 Under the Aitutaki Declaration, the PIF 
recognised that it did not have the capacity to deal with such situations and established that 
such a regional security framework was necessary.
182
 The Aitutaki Declaration emphasised 
the importance of cooperation around security in the region, highlighting the most 
significant threats as natural disasters, transnational crime and ‘economic, social and 
environmental policies’.183The Declaration expressed the importance of a regional 
approach to security, while highlighting external sovereignty threats to the region, which 
would require rapid response capability and reinforcement of existing mechanisms, such as 
sub-regional groupings. It was decided that cooperation within the Forum on security 
issues would be based on four guiding principles. First, a commitment to a cooperative 
security approach in the region. Second, emphasis is placed upon good governance, 
sustainable development and international cooperation principles, including the importance 
of preventive diplomacy, in order to reinforce regional security. Third, the primacy of 
prevention is emphasised when it comes to deterring conflict, with a major goal being to 
reduce, contain and resolve conflicts by peaceful means. Fourth, in order to further support 
peace and security, opportunities to cooperate will be taken advantage of wherever 
possible.
184
 As a result of these principles, the Declaration recommended that the ability of 
the Pacific Islands Forum to carry out preventive diplomacy be bolstered, further meetings 
of the Forum Regional Security Committee be scheduled and the establishment of a 
threshold at which the FRSC is required to meet to address an emergency.
185
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In evaluating the effectiveness of the Aitutaki Declaration, Peebles has stated that 
“The importance of the Aitutaki Declaration was in broadening the Forum’s interest in 
security matters from law enforcement cooperation (as in the Honiara Declaration), to the 
broader arena of ‘natural disasters, environmental damage and unlawful challenges to 
national integrity and independence’.”186 The Aitutaki Declaration emphasised the 
importance of prevention in order to avoid conflict before it occurs and the importance of 
maintaining peace and security in the region. As has been elaborated upon previously, the 
accumulation of SALW is one of many factors that contribute to conflict and they are also 
regularly used in tribal conflict and crime within PNG.  When PNG agreed to the Aitutaki 
Declaration as part of its membership of the PIF, this may be viewed as a tacit 
acknowledgement of the importance of prevention both in the region and within PNG itself 
along with the effects of SALW on peace and security.  
 
Biketawa Declaration 
 Like the Aitutaki Declaration before it, the Biketawa Declaration also followed 
major instances of tension and unrest in the Pacific. The Biketawa Declaration was a 
regional response to the dual-coups in Fiji and the Solomon Islands in 2000. It followed on 
from the Aitutaki Declaration, as it also sought to reinforce regional cooperation and avoid 
instability and unrest through a number of principles. These involved PIF member states 
committing to: 
  
“good governance principles (openness, transparency, accountability, participation, 
consultation, fairness and equity in government); individual, human and democratic 
rights for their citizens; respect for the peaceful transfer of power, rule of law and 
judicial independence inherent in democracy; ensuring that economic, cultural and 
social development is beneficial to all in society; respect for indigenous rights and 
local culture; awareness of factors that may threaten state security and to cooperate 
within the PIF to address them; and adopt a preventive agenda in order to avoid 
conflict and utilise peaceful means to end it.”187 
 
The Declaration placed a particular emphasis upon adopting a regional preventive 
approach in order to avoid the escalation of tension into instability and conflict, with 
particular importance given to addressing ethnic tensions, socio-economic disparities, lack 
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of good governance, land disputes and erosion of cultural values.
188
 In order to carry out 
this preventive agenda, the Declaration specified the need for monitoring of tensions so as 
to determine what, if any, assistance the Forum should provide. When the PIF determines 
that it needs to respond to a crisis or potential crisis, the Declaration specifies seven 
responses that are available to it. These are an official PIF statement, the establishment of a 
Ministerial Action Group, dispatching a  fact-finding mission, formation of an Eminent 
Persons Group, third party mediation, Forum assistance to institutions and other 
mechanisms that play a role in ending a conflict, and a high level meeting of the Forum 
Regional Security Committee (FRSC) or Forum Ministers.
189
 If these responses prove 
unsuccessful, then the Biketawa Declaration specifies that the PIF should “convene a 
special meeting of Forum Leaders to consider other options including if necessary targeted 
measures.”190 The response mechanisms within the Biketawa Declaration have been used 
by the PIF. One example occurred when the Forum formed and dispatched an Eminent 
Persons Group to the Solomon Islands to evaluate the situation following the coup and 
inform the Forum of what assistance was required.
191
The PIF also dispatched its first 
Elections Observer Mission in order to monitor and assist the elections that were occurring 
following the coup.
192
 The Biketawa Declaration can be seen to have contributed to the 
increasing integration agenda around regional security and stability that occurred through 
these multiple agreements. The Declaration emphasised the responsibility of states in 
ensuring democratic principles, rights of citizens and respect for the law, particularly in 
ensuring that instability and eventually conflict does not occur. It also reinforced the 
importance of prevention when it comes to how to respond to crises within states and the 
region. 
 
Nadi Framework 
 Perhaps the most significant regional agreement to come out of the PIF when it 
comes to issues around SALW is the 1996 Nadi Framework. The process towards a model 
weapons control bill was initiated during the PIF meeting in Majuro in the Marshall 
Islands, with the goal being to address the threat of arms trafficking through the region. 
The process towards a regional framework for weapons was put under the responsibility of 
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the FRSC, who were tasked with determining how this might be achieved, and included the 
South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference (SPCPC) and the Oceania Customs 
Organisation (OCO) in the process.
193
 The initial part of this process involved a review of 
existing firearms laws and licencing measures by a SPCPC-OCO sub-committee, followed 
by the creation of a strategy for achieving a regional framework.
194
 The Model Weapons 
Control Bill was the result of the Nadi Framework, which was crafted by the South Pacific 
Chiefs of Police Conference Working Group who had been tasked with creating a draft 
legal framework for a common regional approach to arms control.
195
 In 2000, their draft 
legal framework was submitted to the wider SPCPC for approval before in turn being 
submitted to the FRSC and then the Forum Leaders and finally became the Model 
Weapons Control Bill. The main goal of the Model Weapons Control Bill is to ensure 
public safety through greater gun control measures. The bill states that its two objectives to 
achieve this are “to require each person who possesses or uses a weapon to have a genuine 
reason for possessing or using the weapon; and to provide strict requirements that must be 
satisfied for the importation, possession and use of firearms.”196 In order to satisfy these 
objectives, the bill sets out a number of firearms law recommendations to strengthen 
legislation in states throughout the region. These include a list of banned weapons that are 
not to be imported, exported, held or used; stronger controls on import, export, possession 
and use of weapons; the establishment of a registration and licencing regime; the need for a 
‘genuine reason’ to possess or use a weapon; requirement for safe and secure storage of 
weapons; the establishment of import, export and transfer controls; and requirements of 
arms dealers for record-keeping, display, labelling and repairs of weapons.
197
 In addition to 
these original provisions, a segment that addresses brokering was added in 2010.
198
 By 
adopting these recommendations, it would bring the existing law in Pacific states up to an 
adequate standard (much of which was not), and would ensure that there is uniformly 
strong firearms legislation across the region. When evaluating the effectiveness of regional 
approaches to SALW in the Pacific, especially in relation to how they assist regional 
implementation of the UN PoA, and specifically the Nadi Framework and Model Weapons 
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Control Bill, Kytomaki states that “By developing model legislation, regional organisations 
can prove valuable in establishing best practices and norms on specific aspects of the 
PoA.”199 However, in 2010, it was reported that firearms law throughout the Pacific 
continued to vary in strength between states.
200
 The Model Weapons Control Bill continues 
to face the challenge of ensuring uniform implementation throughout the Pacific.  
When it comes to the effectiveness of the Nadi Framework and the Model Weapons 
Control Bill in PNG specifically, as discussed in a previous section, PNG’s Firearms Act 
covers large parts of what is outlined in the Model Weapons Control Bill. Among the 
notable recommendations of the Model Weapons Control Bill that continue to be absent 
from PNG firearms legislation include a lack of any export controls. The Nadi Framework 
is a significant measure in support of addressing the issue of SALW in the Pacific but it 
has been seen that the government of PNG is yet to update some aspects of its firearms 
legislation to meet these regional standards. One of the major problems that affect the Nadi 
Framework is the fact that, in PNG and across the region, implementation of it remains 
uneven and its influence limited. The Nadi Framework has been largely ignored by states 
in the Pacific, with model legislation no longer being afforded the importance it once had 
which may be seen to be a cause of the uneven implementation it has experienced.  
These four regional measures that have been adopted by Pacific states within the 
Pacific Islands Forum can all be seen to have contributed to increasing regional integration 
around security issues and a willingness to cooperate with their fellow Pacific countries in 
order to ensure that the causes of conflict are addressed and instability and insecurity is 
avoided. When discussing the benefits that regional integration has brought the Pacific 
around SALW issues, the PIF stated in its submission to the 2012 UN PoA review 
conference that “effectively addressing threats posed by SALW can pose significant 
challenges for small states with limited human, technical and financial resources and 
numerous competing policy priorities. Regional approaches have therefore proved vital to 
Pacific states in supporting national policies and activities.”201 Despite this praise for the 
regional integration and focus on SALW and other security issues in the Pacific, this has 
not been followed by much meaningful action. Much of this can be seen to be a result of 
the weak language used and the non-binding nature of these agreements. This is 
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particularly evident within the two most recent Pacific Island Forum Communiqués in 
2011 and 2012, where SALW was barely mentioned. The only SALW-related subject 
within the 2011 PIF Communiqué pertained to the ATT, specifically welcoming progress 
made at a recent PrepCom meeting and expressing a desire to formulate a common PIF 
position on the ATT
202
. SALW did not even rate a mention in the 2012 Communiqué. It 
might be reasonable to conclude that despite strong rhetoric from the PIF and its member 
states on SALW, there has been little by way of action in support with little progress being 
made in implementing its recommendations through the region. 
 
International measures 
 This final section will examine measures that are aimed at addressing SALW at the 
international level and analyse progress on their implementation. It will focus primarily on 
the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects as the major international 
agreement on SALW that PNG has adopted. It will also take a lesser look at the UN 
Firearms Protocol, UN Small Arms Register, Wassenaar Arrangement and the Arms Trade 
Treaty in relation to PNG. 
 
UN PoA 
 Since the creation of the UN PoA in 2001, PNG has submitted two national reports 
on its implementation. In these reports it has described the actions they have taken to 
implement the aspects of the UN PoA. In its 2005 national report, PNG stated its 
commitment to the UN PoA and the issue of illicit SALW when it said that “This report 
depicts PNG’s significant achievements and the government’s acknowledgement of the 
seriousness of illegal use of guns since the outcome of the 2001 conference.”203 PNG 
reported in 2005 that their national coordination agency is made up of the law and justice 
sector National Coordination Mechanism, with a Law and Justice Sector Working Group 
(LJSWG) under its authority, who are involved in the policy process relating to SALW. 
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The LJSWG has representatives from a number of areas of government including the 
RPNGC on behalf of the Ministry of Internal Security, the Ministry of Defence, the Justice 
Department and the Attorney General.
204
 The PNG permanent mission to the UN is the 
national point of contact for UN PoA implementation matters, keeping in contact with the 
PNG Department of Foreign Affairs who cooperate with the LJSWG.
205
In the 2005 report, 
PNG highlighted its lack of export control legislation that is required under the UN PoA, 
which it attributes to the absence of an arms manufacturing sector in the country. Also in 
this section, the parts of the Firearms Act that regulate production, import, transit and 
retransfer of SALW are outlined.
206
 The outlawing of the manufacture, possession, 
stockpiling and trade of illicit SALW is also reported, along with the penalties that they 
incur. The policies for addressing stockpile management and security were outlined as 
being under individual standard operating procedures of the defence force, police and any 
other bodies that have firearms, and surplus weapons collection and disposal was described 
as being undertaken on a case-by-case basis. PNG cited in the 2005 national report their 
lack of specific laws related to brokering, while illicit brokering is already covered by the 
Firearms Act.  PNG also has no marking requirement for locally manufactured weapons, 
due to the absence of a local industry, but those imported by the state are required to be 
marked with the manufacturer’s serial number and recorded by the state. 207 PNG cited 
their involvement in the Nadi Framework process in the section pertaining to activities 
they have been involved in at the regional level, as well as their participation in the 
establishment of Transnational Crime Centres in the region.
208
 In addition to this, the 
assistance that PNG received from Australia in regards to their reform and capacity 
building of their defence and police forces, as well as assistance from NZ with their post-
conflict recovery programme in Bougainville, was listed.
209
 PNG cited a number of 
international agreements they had signed on terrorism and transnational crime, assistance 
they had provided their neighbours with UN PoA implementation and cooperation with 
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NGOs on illicit SALW within the section relating to global activities.
210
 When PNG 
submitted its national report on implementation of the UN PoA in 2012, the details it 
provided within it were very similar to that in their 2005 report. In addition to this, PNG 
also requested international assistance in developing a SALW tracing regime as they had 
identified the lack of one as one aspect of their firearms law that required remedying in 
their latest report.
211
 In the PIF’s submission to the 2012 UN PoA review conference, it is 
stated that the Forum has scheduled two annual meetings designed to discuss how 
implementation of the UN PoA can be further supported throughout the region along with 
a number of actions in support of this.
212
  PNG’s national reports on the UN PoA, 
especially the 2005 report, provided an in-depth overview of their SALW law with the 
2012 report providing an update on what has changed in the seven years between reports.  
Implementation of the UN PoA in PNG and the Pacific has been reviewed by a 
number of different people. Wilson states that a major problem for Pacific states is that “in 
a region that, when compared to others, is hardly ravaged by the illicit trade in small arms 
and light weapons, the challenge arises when attempting to sustain action while remaining 
relevant to local concerns.”213 It is in this regard that SALW issues often rise and fall in 
significance within the region, when maintaining a constant focus upon them would better 
serve the implementation of the UN PoA. As a result of this, many of the actions that have 
been taken by Pacific states within their UN PoA obligations have been directly motivated 
by their relevance within specific states. This has included the likes of stockpile reform, 
weapons collections, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, capacity building 
in the police, justice and prison sectors, and others.
214
 When these specific areas of 
relevance have been addressed, there has been a strong feeling in Pacific states that they 
have solved the problem and that there is no need to maintain a continuous focus on 
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SALW issues.
215
 Wilson states that this view within the Pacific needs to change and a 
regular focus on SALW issues maintained, in order to prevent the occurrence of trafficking 
and build-up of SALW in states in the region, with the UN PoA being an important 
instrument of prevention in ensuring this does not occur.
216
 While determining statistics on 
SALW deaths is relatively easy, monitoring the effectiveness of the UN PoA in actually 
preventing deaths from SALW and armed violence is markedly more difficult. When 
measuring the effectiveness of the UN PoA, Goldring states that “Right now, the only 
resources available to governments and civil society are the country reports. It would help 
if more countries submitted those reports in a timely fashion, but those reports alone are 
insufficient.”217 As a result of this, UNIDIR has evaluated national reports on the UN PoA 
over the five years following its creation and classified the scope of reporting in PNG’s 
2005 national report as being ‘heavy’, having followed the reporting guidelines provided 
and completing most of the sections within the guidelines in some detail.
218
 It is in this way 
that PNG can be seen to be fulfilling the reporting obligations of the UN PoA, albeit 
irregularly, providing in-depth detail on their firearms legislation and other required detail, 
along with making requests for assistance to strengthen areas where they are weak. Despite 
fulfilling these obligations, the PNG firearms legislation is still affected by weak 
implementation domestically. This means that despite meeting much of the required 
standard, it has been largely ineffective at the national level at addressing the illicit 
trafficking, accumulation and use of SALW in PNG. 
 
Other international measures 
 While the UN PoA forms the most significant international SALW instrument that 
PNG supports, there are several others that are supported by PNG to varying degrees. 
When it comes to the UN Firearms Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which requires 
signatories to enact legislation to outlaw the illicit manufacture and transfer of illicit 
SALW, PNG is yet to sign or ratify this treaty despite sections of the Firearms Act 
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addressing these issues.
219
As for the UN Register of Conventional Arms, PNG has not 
filed any reports relating to its arms imports or exports.
220
 Because the Wassenaar 
Arrangement does not have an observer category and PNG is not an exporter of SALW, it 
is not a participating state in the agreement.
221
 One of the most anticipated international 
events aimed at addressing SALW came in 2009 when a vote was held on UN General 
Assembly Resolution 64/48, which initiated negotiations towards the creation of a legally 
binding Arms Trade Treaty, which PNG voted in favour of. This process culminated in a 
conference on such a treaty in 2013, where the ATT was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly.
222
 At the first meeting to agree on the ATT that took place through July 2012, 
both PNG and the PIF made statements to the conference. Within their statement, PNG 
referred to their own issues around SALW and their effects, stating that “The proliferation 
of these weapons pose serious challenges to the effective maintenance of law and order, 
development aspirations and our national security.”223 They also outlined four caveats to 
their support for the ATT. The first caveat in the PNG’s statement was that they stated 
their support for the rights of states to individual or collective self-defence as enshrined in 
Article 51 of the UN Charter. The second caveat they expressed was a desire to see clauses 
included that would require capacity building, national regulatory and monitoring systems 
and a strong legislative framework in order to ensure that implementation of such a treaty 
is effective.
224
 The third caveat was their advocacy for the inclusion of provisions for 
international assistance to states in fulfilling their obligations and the creation of an 
implementation support unit in order to achieve this. The fourth and final caveat PNG 
included in its ATT statement was its support for individual state reporting in order to 
more effectively gauge how effective such a treaty is between states, in addition to regional 
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reporting.
225
 Despite their support for the ATT, the effect that it would have on the SALW 
problem in PNG is unlikely to be significant. This is primarily because most of the SALW 
proliferation problems experienced by PNG are a result of corruption in security forces, 
poor stockpile security and management and craft production of arms. In contrast to this, 
the ATT aims to regulate the international arms trade, within which PNG is a very minor 
player. When compared to PNG’s strong support for the ATT, they have demonstrated 
little willingness to show the same commitment to other significant SALW agreements like 
the Firearms Protocol and the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which they have to yet 
to sign up to or submit reports on respectively.    
 This chapter has argued that PNG has undertaken a number of measures that seek 
to address SALW and armed violence to varying degrees of effectiveness. It has covered 
national, regional and international measures that have been aimed at this. What is clear is 
that, despite their best efforts at addressing SALW through these measures, these weapons 
continue to spread and contribute to armed violence throughout PNG with no sign of any 
significant progress. The failure of these measures to address SALW problems in PNG has 
been attributed to a number of reasons. These have included weak implementation of 
existing firearms laws, dysfunction within the police force, lack of political will to 
implement changes proposed by the Gun Summit, the weak language and uneven 
implementation of regional agreements and the relevance of international agreements to 
the unique circumstances of PNG. Much of this can be attributed to the attitude of the PNG 
government and the associated security forces, who have regularly demonstrated a failure 
to back up what is frequently ambitious rhetoric with anything resembling action in 
support of it. It is within this context that this thesis will seek to find new ways to address 
this in the next chapter. The measures have been taken in PNG have also been largely 
focused on addressing the supply side of the arms trade. The next chapter will take an 
alternative approach to this and will instead examine the concept of demand-reduction in 
relation to SALW and evaluate SALW interventions globally and in PNG in relation to 
demand-reduction by analysing how effective they have been at reducing demand for 
SALW. 
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Chapter Five: Demand reduction in Papua New Guinea 
  
It is now evident that the proliferation of SALW and the associated armed violence 
are significant issues in many parts of the world, including in PNG. In addition to this, the 
circumstances that are specific to PNG’s own problems with SALW and armed violence 
have been well documented. As was highlighted in previous chapters, there have been a 
significant number of measures taken in an attempt to address the SALW and armed 
violence problems in PNG to varying degrees of success. Among these are international 
agreements such as the UN PoA and the ATT, regional measures including the Nadi 
Framework and national initiatives like the Firearms Act, National Gun Summit, PNGDF 
reform and the Bougainville Peace Agreement. The previous chapters have shown that the 
effectiveness of contemporary efforts at addressing these problems in PNG has been 
limited. This chapter will focus on the concept of demand reduction, which is the partner 
of the supply-side initiatives that have been the focus of much of the efforts adopted in 
PNG, and analyse the role it has played in programmes targeting SALW and armed 
violence in PNG. This chapter seeks to provide an overview of demand reduction, analyse 
SALW interventions that have taken place globally and in PNG and examine the role that 
demand reduction has played in them. It will consider how demand reduction might 
facilitate new ways of addressing SALW and armed violence in PNG.  
 
Overview of demand reduction 
 The trade in SALW is driven by two separate but symbiotic elements. These are 
supply and demand, which have featured to varying degrees in the international debate 
surrounding SALW issues. Much of the international efforts aimed at addressing the 
proliferation of SALW around the world have primarily focused on the supply side of the 
arms trade, and this has also been particularly true of efforts within PNG. This section will 
examine several issues. These are: what demand is and how it applies to SALW, the nature 
of its relationship with supply, the types of actors that have been found to feature in 
demand reduction activities and in supply-side initiatives and the types of activities that 
make up demand reduction.  
Where regions and countries are affected by the proliferation of SALW, this is 
frequently because a number of different factors have conspired to generate high levels of 
demand for them. Where significant demand for SALW exists, there are suppliers willing 
to sell. There are many factors that have been attributed as influencing demand for SALW; 
50 
 
these often fall within the likes of criminal motivations and social, economic and political 
factors.
226
 The concept of demand has been defined by Atwood, Glatz and Muggah as 
being made up of two elements, means and motivations. The motivations element of 
demand is made up of both individual and group preferences, which are themselves made 
up of what are called deep and derived preferences. Deep preferences are those that are set 
and which cannot be altered, like the need for personal and socio-economic security, while 
derived preferences are related preferences but alternative means to achieve these deep 
preferences, like acquiring SALW to ensure security in the absence of an effective police 
force. The means aspect of demand refers to both monetary and non-monetary means, and 
prices relating to real and relative prices.
227
 All of these elements of demand occur 
interdependently with one another, with the presence or absence of one or more 
influencing the acquisition decisions made. This means that whichever of these factors are 
present in an area determines how demand plays out if at all, such as some motivations for 
SALW acquisition being present, but a lack of means may prevent it from happening.  
Regehr has outlined six factors of his own that influence demand at the individual 
and community levels. The first of these demand factors is state failure, which is when 
states no longer have the capability to ensure the security of their own population during 
civil war, which then forces individuals and communities into obtaining the means to 
ensure their own security.
228
 The second demand factor is public peril, which occurs when 
local populations lose faith in state functions, like police forces, to protect them from the 
likes of rising crime and to ensure their security, which in turn can increase demand for 
SALW within these communities to ensure their own security.
229
 The third demand factor 
is underdevelopment, with a link between under-development and armed violence evident, 
particularly that under-development can be a cause of armed violence and that armed 
violence often facilitates under-development, both of which can fuel demand for SALW.
230
 
The fourth demand factor is availability, where the higher the numbers of SALW available 
are, the greater the demand for SALW is when compared to areas with fewer weapons. 
Regehr states that “the bottom line is that the availability of guns transforms social 
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instability into armed violence and armed conflict, and in the process exacerbates poverty, 
competition over resources, and alienation.”231 The fifth SALW demand factor is security 
sector abuses, where ineffective, unaccountable or corrupt state forces mean that 
communities lose faith in these forces which in turn results in difficulties in getting the 
public to buy into SALW reduction efforts, and can also contribute to greater demand for 
them.
232
 The sixth and final demand factor outlined by Regehr is cultures of violence, 
where the likes of SALW become an ingrained part of local culture and their possession 
and use are promoted as a social norm, which serves to increase demand for them.
233
  
When outlining what it believes increases demand for SALW, the Quaker United 
Nations Office (QUNO) outlines the threat of the outbreak of violence, ongoing warfare 
with little end in sight and being unable to ensure security against threats to personal 
security and livelihoods.
234
 QUNO goes on to state that “Perceived vulnerability is 
exacerbated particularly by the inability of the state to provide adequate security and 
protection through policing, causing people to arm themselves in self-defence.”235 It can 
now be seen that demand for SALW is made up of a number of different factors, all of 
which fall within the political, economic and social categories as well as criminal 
motivations. When these factors combine, demand for SALW increases and, as long as 
there are suppliers willing to sell, SALW numbers rise in these areas. 
As has been discussed previously, the concept of demand is inextricably linked 
with the variable of supply and each cannot be discussed without acknowledging the other. 
How these two forces interact with one another determines the price of particular items, 
and this is also true when it comes to illicit SALW. For example, where demand for SALW 
is high but supply is low it is generally accepted that the price will increase and, 
alternately, where demand is low but supply is high, then prices will go down. It is in this 
way that to effectively address the trade in an illicit good, then both the demand for and 
supply must be addressed equally. Despite this, for much of the last few decades demand 
for SALW has not received the attention that it deserves when analysing the problem of 
SALW proliferation. It may be suggested that a reason for this is that, while supply 
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measures are not as effective, they are easier to do for states and the results are more 
tangible. The focus on the supply side of the trade in SALW has meant that there has been 
limited success in addressing the issue of illicit SALW. Despite much of the focus of 
efforts at combatting SALW being centred upon restricting supply and availability of 
SALW by further regulating manufacture and trade, the long life of SALW means that 
such weapons can be used many times over and bought and sold across borders as long as 
there is demand for them.
236
 Weiss has cited the example of assault rifles, specifically AK-
47s and M-16s that were used by combatants in the Vietnam War, which re-emerged in 
various other locations around the world decades later, including in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador, which demonstrates that these firearms can last as long as there is demand for 
them and that demand needs to be equally addressed.
237
 It is in this way that the forces of 
supply and demand are equally important when trying to reduce the illicit trade in SALW. 
Failure to adequately address one or the other often results in limited success in efforts at 
addressing SALW. 
Over much of the last few decades, there has been a clear demarcation between 
those groups which have sought to focus on the supply side and those which have 
addressed demand. As discussed in the previous section, efforts at addressing SALW have 
been dominated by a focus on the supply side for many years, which has been driven by 
states and state interests, with this state influence resulting in measures that are “typically 
top-down, formulaic and standardised.”238 During much of the 1990s, most state actors 
within the disarmament debate held the supply side as the most important aspect to 
address, and therefore this featured centrally within much of the practical disarmament 
activities through this decade, with demand featuring very little.
239
 During this time, 
awareness of the relationship between development and disarmament was increasing and 
contributed to the growing importance placed upon concepts like human security.
240
 While 
this had little impact on the disarmament debate, due in large part to the obscure nature of 
state responsibilities that demand side action involves when compared to supply-side 
initiatives, the wider disarmament community soon began to realise the importance of a 
demand-side approach to complement the supply-side in order to effectively address 
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SALW issues.
241
 While the discussion of demand issues among international disarmament 
practitioners is a relatively recent phenomenon, activities aimed at addressing demand have 
been occurring at the local level for some time. The role of civil society in demand-
reduction has been highlighted by the QUNO when they state that “where states are unable 
or unwilling to undertake disarmament and demand-reduction activities seriously, civil 
society entities have frequently filled the gap, often in ingenious and innovative ways.”242 
It has been in this way that traditional demand reduction activities have generally been 
initiated and sustained at the local level, while supply-side initiatives have been focused on 
controls at the national, regional and international levels.
243
 Through the 2000s, awareness 
of the role of demand and the development of what has been termed a demand optic has 
been advanced within the development and disarmament sectors. For example, the July 
2005 Second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme 
of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects engaged in discussion around demand for SALW and the need 
to enhance ways of addressing SALW demand within the UN PoA.
244
 The UN PoA itself 
contained one of the most important advances in acknowledging the importance of demand 
side action as it, while not formally committing specifically to demand reduction, covered 
areas that have been recognised as also being important to demand side action, including 
development, promoting cultures of peace, conflict resolution and security sector 
reform.
245
 This growing demand lens promotes a security-first and development-driven 
approach, based largely on the increasingly evident link between security and 
development, which has been promoted by civil society for a number of years and was 
recognised in the 2004 UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
246
 It is in 
this way that many of the efforts aimed at SALW around the world have been pursued 
separately, divided between those who are focussed on the supply of SALW, like states 
and much of the disarmament community, and those who feature the demand for SALW 
centrally in their efforts, primarily local groups and NGOs, but there is a growing 
awareness of the importance of demand side action throughout the disarmament 
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community. Divisions such as these are also apparent in specific countries, including PNG, 
which can provide opportunities for new SALW action that will be further discussed later 
on. 
In order to effectively address the demand side of the SALW trade equation, a 
number of strategies have been developed. In addition to highlighting factors that increase 
demand for SALW, as mentioned previously, Regehr also set out six measures designed to 
reduce demand. The first is restoring public institutions. This involves reforming the 
institutions of the state, whose role it is to ensure the security of communities and prevent 
violence, but are not maintaining these responsibilities, in such a way that communities are 
able to regain trust and confidence in these institutions and the state as a whole. This can 
be achieved by increasing the accountability of the state, particularly through encouraging 
greater public participation in the activities of the state, which helps to improve confidence 
in governments.
247
 The second measure to reduce demand for SALW is upholding public 
safety, which is based upon the responsibility of the state to utilise its monopoly on the use 
of force when it comes to law enforcement, to ensure that order is maintained and its 
population is secure. In conjunction with this, the state must also work to facilitate an 
environment where the social and economic conditions are such that citizens are 
encouraged to willingly abide by these laws, so that enforcement of the law is relied on 
less than maintaining this culture of peace, by providing the conditions to encourage 
citizens to adhere to the law.
248
 The third demand reduction measure is promoting 
development, where appropriately targeted development programmes by the state can 
prevent the outbreak of violence by addressing conditions that lead to conflict, and 
therefore serve to increase the demand for SALW. Regehr states that “effectively targeted 
poverty reduction and development efforts as well as human rights and public safety 
efforts can effectively reduce violence and the demand for SALW.”249 Regehr’s fourth 
suggestion is reducing SALW availability because, as discussed before, ready availability 
of SALW often also fuels demand, which means that controls on the supply of SALW are 
one of the necessary components of demand-reduction.
250
 The fifth measure for demand-
reduction is security sector reform. In order to ensure that populations have faith and trust 
in security forces there must be strong accountability within these institutions, which 
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occurs through a strong commitment to global human rights and humanitarian law 
standards.
251
 The sixth, and final, demand-reduction measure is promoting ‘cultures of 
peace’, particularly through education programmes and public awareness campaigns that 
are focused on the problems that SALW cause and which target all parts of society. Within 
this, civil society must be given a prominent role, particularly around determining what 
causes and sustains cultures of violence, and to provide the education and training that 
focuses on peace education and how to manage and resolve conflict.
252
 Weiss has also 
outlined measures through which demand for SALW can be reduced, which seek to change 
environments that are conducive to SALW acquisition and armed violence, by focusing on 
education, childhood development, cycles of violence and social cohesion among other 
such measures.
253
  QUNO has recommended five important themes to focus on in demand 
reduction activities. These are conflict-sensitive development, gender mainstreaming and 
positive engagement of youth (to provide alternatives to armed violence, particularly for 
young men), governance and security sector reform, conflict prevention, resolution and 
reconciliation and effective DDR programmes for ex-combatants.
254
  
It can be seen that demand-reduction targets the local environment in order create 
the conditions where people do not feel the need to resort to small arms. As this section has 
shown, demand is influenced by a number of different factors that result in different 
outcomes depending which factors are interacting in a certain location. It has also been 
seen that the forces of demand and supply are inseparable when seeking to address SALW 
yet they have often been pursued separately, with states traditionally focusing on the 
supply-side and civil society and NGOs targeting demand-reduction. The next section will 
focus on SALW interventions that have occurred in three countries around the world and in 
PNG, before analysing their impact upon demand-reduction. 
 
SALW interventions and demand-reduction around the world 
 All around the world, groups including central government, local government, 
NGOs and civil society have been involved in activities aimed at reducing the levels of 
SALW and armed violence in their areas. These have taken a variety of forms, targeting 
both supply and demand. This section will focus first on examples of countries around the 
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world that have targeted their own local SALW issues and the actions they have taken, 
specifically in Brazil, South Africa and Colombia, before examining examples of actions 
that have occurred in PNG, and evaluating how successful they have been at reducing 
SALW demand. 
 
Brazil 
 Illicit SALW have been found to be a particular problem within Brazil, especially 
in urban areas like Rio de Janeiro, with large numbers in circulation and their use in armed 
violence prevalent. In order to help to address the SALW problems experienced in Brazil, 
the Brazilian government passed the Disarmament Statute in 2003 which enabled them to 
launch a national buy-back programme with the support of a significant proportion of the 
population. This programme spanned an initial three month amnesty period in 2004 where 
financial compensation of $US 40-120 was given for each weapon that was handed over, 
which resulted in the collection of over two hundred thousand weapons at the end of this 
period.  By the halfway point of the buy-back, the projections for total guns collected had 
already been exceeded.
255
 The success of this programme resulted in an extension of it for 
a further six months, which resulted in a total of four hundred thousand SALW being 
collected over the entire period of the amnesty.
256
 The effect of the gun buy-back 
programme, in conjunction with other components of the Disarmament Statute, has been 
evaluated as potentially contributing to an eight per cent decrease in firearms-related 
deaths in Brazil between 2003 and 2004.
257
 When categorising programmes such as gun 
buy-back programmes or amnesties, they are usually included within the scope of supply-
side measures. However, such programmes can be seen to also have an impact on the 
demand for SALW such as by increasing the price of these weapons as the numbers 
available fall, and the success of amnesties and buy-backs can also be seen to demonstrate 
what is called ‘negative’ demand for these weapons.258 These measures were 
complemented by a simultaneous increase in other costs associated with SALW 
possession, including fees related to registering weapons and licenses as well as penalties 
for illegal possession rising. Since this initial 2004 national gun buy-back, there have been 
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two others in 2009 and 2011, with the 2004 and 2009 amnesties receiving a combined 1.1 
million firearms.
259
 Despite the immediate positive effects that these measures 
experienced, demand for SALW in Brazil is still significant and will remain so in the 
absence of further demand reduction initiatives.
260
  
One of the criticisms of the 2004 programme came from gun control proponents 
who criticised the reluctance of the federal police to allow civil society groups to be 
involved, and have remained closed to suggestions for improving efficiency. The overall 
impact of the 2004 programme was also questioned, with an LA Times article stating that 
“The number of firearms handed over is miniscule compared with the total believed to be 
in circulation, and daily headlines here in Rio throb with accounts of fatal street robberies, 
shootouts between criminals and police and wanton bloodletting among feuding drug 
gangs that have no intention of surrendering their stockpiles.”261 When compared with the 
numbers of guns in Brazil at the time, said to be between eight and twenty million, the 
numbers of guns collected in the amnesty were only a fraction of this total and firearms 
deaths at the time were forty thousand a year, or one every twelve minutes.
262
 It was found 
that the gun owners who were surrendering their firearms were mostly citizens aged over 
fifty and that the youth, who are the largest group of gun users and victims, were still 
largely holding their weapons.
263
 Another issue that was found to undermine the gun buy-
back programme was that public confidence in the Brazil Federal Police was very low due 
to corruption and other issues, which meant that many people were unwilling to surrender 
their weapons to the police. Additionally, because the police refused to allow civil society 
groups to receive surrendered weapons, any chance for greater participation was further 
undermined; this was because citizens trusted civil society groups more with the weapons 
that would be handed in and were more likely to comply.
264
 It is in this way that the actions 
that were aimed at reducing SALW levels and levels of armed violence in Brazil have only 
had a limited effect at reducing the demand for these weapons. Much of this can be seen to 
come down to the fact that they have primarily been aimed at reducing supply, particularly 
through buy-backs, while issues that motivate the demand for SALW have been largely 
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ignored. This was particularly evident in the unwillingness of the police to include civil 
society in the collection programme, which would have increased its chances of success 
because of the lack of trust the public has in the police, which also serves to increase 
demand. As a result, there are still large numbers of illicit SALW throughout Brazil. 
  
Colombia 
 As in Brazil, there have also been measures designed to address Colombia’s SALW 
problem implemented at the local level, particularly in Bogota. These local measures have 
included greater investment from the Bogota government for police infrastructure such as 
improved data collection capability along with the creation of the Security and Vigilance 
Fund, which enabled the Bogota Municipal Police Department to increase their presence 
and capability for random searches for illegal arms, increased the police department’s 
budget and provided the local government with greater influence on law enforcement 
policies.
265
 Local government in Colombia also has the power to restrict the carrying of 
firearms within municipal boundaries which has enabled Bogota to place these restrictions 
on specific days, which have occurred on election days, weekends, days following payday, 
particular holidays, some weekdays and the Christmas/New Year holiday period.
266
 
Analysis has found that on these days homicides across Colombia were between fifteen 
and twenty per cent lower than normal, but further analysis concluded that the reduction 
found in Bogota correlated most with districts where the institutional police presence and 
enforcement mechanisms were strongest.
267
  In addition to this, a voluntary gun amnesty 
was implemented in Bogota with anecdotal evidence suggesting that it resulted in the 
collection of five thousand firearms, and helped to alter how a large portion of the local 
population viewed gun possession and their sense of security following the amnesty, 
according to surveys.
268
 A focus on crime prevention was also adopted in Bogota, which 
sought to increase community integration and engagement through neighbourhood watch 
groups, by promoting personal investment in the community and respect for the property of 
others by encouraging greater reporting of crime and police-facilitated conflict 
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resolution.
269
 Atwood et al state that these national and local initiatives did make a 
contribution to a reduction of homicides at both levels, particularly as a result of greater 
cooperation between local government and police, more investment in urban development 
and more community participation.
270
  
Almost twenty years later, in 2012, a Universidad del Rosario study found that 
there are now four times as many illegal firearms as legal ones in Colombia, equating to 
two million legal and eight million illegal SALW, with ninety per cent of firearms-related 
murders involving illegal weapons.
271
 To combat this continuing high homicide rate and 
other crime, a three month ban on carrying firearms in the streets of Bogota was put in 
place by the city’s Mayor on February 1 2012, with an eye to making it permanent 
depending upon its impact. Research on similar gun bans in other regions of Colombia in 
2009 and 2010 concluded that they had resulted in homicide rates decreasing by an average 
of twenty three per cent and firearms-related injuries by fifty three per cent.
272
 Another 
goal of the gun ban was to help to change how citizens of Bogota viewed firearms, with 
Mayor Petro stating that “It’s part of a policy of laying down weapons, believing in the 
state’s monopoly over weapons and generating a culture of tolerance and love.”273 This 
initiative was followed by a commitment from central government that it would implement 
legislation to put stricter controls on firearm ownership. This gun ban has so far been 
extended for a further two three-month periods.  
Despite officials attributing a drop in homicide rates to this gun ban, other factors 
have been cited as having also played a role that has not been acknowledged. The first of 
these is the national urban security initiative that began in 2011, known as Plan 
Cuadrantes, which sought to divide cities into many smaller units with their own dedicated 
police base in order to encourage greater integration with the local community, with the 
police citing this plan as the major force behind the drop in crime in Bogota.
274
 The second 
factor was the 2011 reform of liquor laws in Bogota, which restricted the purchase and 
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consumption of alcohol, which has been found to have been involved in ninety per cent of 
crime in the 2010 year.
275
 In addition to these two factors, the time frame in which the gun 
ban has been in place has been cited as being too short to conclusively determine that it has 
been the contributing factor in the fall in homicide rates, especially when falling murder 
rates in other cities and declining nationwide unemployment suggest that it simply may be 
part of a nationwide trend.
276
 In a critical analysis Ramsey has stated that “attempts to 
concretely link the availability of weapons with homicide rates elsewhere in Latin America 
have proved problematic, meaning that at the very least a degree of scepticism is necessary 
before hailing Bogota’s gun ban as a policy model for reigning in security in the region.”277 
This combination of measures aimed at reducing SALW and armed violence in Bogota, 
ranging from a new legal framework at the national level to greater police support and 
resourcing, gun amnesties, crime prevention and gun carrying bans at the local level, has 
placed a lot of focus on supply side measures but has also utilised some demand-side 
measures, particularly the crime prevention aspect. Following the implementation of these 
measures in the 1990s and second decade of the 21
st
 century, it has been shown that there 
was a noticeable decrease in homicide rates in Bogota on both occasions. While the debate 
around the extent of the direct impact of these measures on homicide rates continues, it is 
generally agreed that homicide rates have decreased during this time. 
 
South Africa 
 The final example of an intervention aimed at reducing demand for weapons is 
South Africa. Two of the most significant interventions aimed at SALW in South Africa 
have been carried out by civil society groups, in the form of the Gun-Free Zone (GFZ) 
project, and the state, in the form of Firearms-Free Zones (FFZ) that are part of the 
Firearms Control Act in South Africa. A gun amnesty in South Africa was one of the first 
actions of a fledgling gun control movement in the wake of the first democratic elections in 
1994, when a day long amnesty was held by the state and civil society.
278
 This initial effort 
spawned the NGO called Gun-free South Africa (GFSA) in 1995, who then created the 
GFZ project. The GFZ project was established with two main goals in mind, the first being 
to provide areas known as ‘safe spaces’ where people can have confidence in their safety 
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and security free from firearms, and the second being to alter the community’s perception 
of SALW from viewing them as ‘security enabling’ to ‘security threatening’.279 These two 
goals seek “to provide individuals with alternative derived preferences to fulfil the deep 
preference for protection and security, as well as means to obtain individual status and 
group status without carrying firearms.”280 The GFZ project covers places like schools, 
hospitals, businesses, churches and other areas in the public domain, but the GFZ 
mechanism itself is completely voluntary. This means that compliance with GFZs is also 
voluntary, and there is no body that enforces it, so people have to commit themselves to 
abide by it. This voluntary compliance is promoted and encouraged using three principles, 
which are: facilitation by those individuals or groups who have a direct interest in and 
those affected by GFZs, participation of these individuals and groups in the process and 
flexible implementation of GFZs.
281
 Any individual or group can start a GFZ, in 
cooperation with stakeholders (those being GFSA), and it is in this way that the GFZ 
concept has expanded rapidly in South Africa. The GFZ project has had two significant 
effects according to Atwood et al, these are that participation in the GFZ implementation 
process, especially by those who used to own SALW, is seen to increase citizens’ social 
status in the community, and it has contributed to the creation of a new ‘norm’ whereby the 
compliance with the GFZ by some encourages compliance by others and is self-sustaining 
in that way.
282
  
 According to IRIN, one of the most significant effects that the GFZs have had in 
South Africa has been to change attitudes towards firearms, with IRIN quoting a leading 
researcher as saying that “the GFZ sign [usually prominently displayed at the entrance of a 
GFZ] has become an incredibly strong symbol, challenging gun-owners and letting them 
know guns are not socially acceptable here; they are not cool”.283 It is in this way that one 
of the goals of the GFZs has been to challenge the social acceptability of guns and the 
inherent ‘gun culture’ in South Africa, particularly the link between gun ownership and 
masculinity. The success of the GFZ project has been attributed by one sociologist to the 
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lack of state involvement, and primarily the fact that they are community driven.
284
 While 
they have had some positive effects, results have also varied between locations and it has 
been found that the effectiveness of GFZs is increased in areas with greater social cohesion 
than in those where it is lesser, especially in challenging the norms that make carrying 
SALW acceptable. It has been found that, even in an area where a GFZ exists, if feelings 
of insecurity persist then some people will still have demand for SALW to carry outside of 
that GFZ.
285
 Despite some issues that have affected the success of some GFZs in South 
Africa, Atwood et al have concluded that the GFZ experiment has had success at reducing 
demand for SALW within the boundaries of GFZs. The state has taken the lead from GFZs 
and has included the concept of FFZs in the Firearms Control Act, which allows the 
Minister of Safety and Security to designate FFZ status to certain premises or categories of 
premises, within which the possession of firearms or ammunition is outlawed.
286
 When it 
comes to the state-run FFZs set out in the Firearms Control Act, Atwood et al have stated 
that the FFZs were too young in their existence to be able to measure their effectiveness.
287
 
Changing attitudes and eradicating firearms in South Africa has faced some challenges 
however, including issues such as that, like in particularly tough areas, many people won’t 
report the presence of a firearm until an event like a firearms-related death occurs, and 
intimidation is so high in some areas that it discourages people from coming forward as 
witnesses to crime.
288
 While GFZs have helped to challenge the perception of insecurity, 
an overriding view is that by declaring your area a GFZ, residents expose themselves to 
increased danger despite the available evidence suggesting that this is not the case.
289
  
It can be seen that the GFZ concept has experienced success in addressing the issue 
of SALW, and reducing demand for SALW, in many of the parts of South Africa where 
they are present. Much of this can be put down to the strong emphasis that GFSA has 
placed on community involvement in the creation and implementation of the GFZ project. 
This, in conjunction with the voluntary nature of the GFZs, means that a significant degree 
of community buy-in on the GFZ project is required which has meant local communities 
become invested in the success of the zones. This success has also been helped by the 
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increased social status that has been found to come from buying into it and also from the 
creation of a self-sustaining norm that has allowed the GFZs to spread. Much of the 
success of GFZs has also been attributed to the locally-driven nature of the project, with 
the absence of the state being a significant asset. This has all resulted in a greater sense of 
safety and security for residents living and working within the GFZs than had generally 
been experienced before their implementation in addition to altering how many 
communities view SALW from positively to negatively. As a result of all of these factors, 
demand for SALW can be seen to be largely reduced by successful GFZs. Despite this, 
there still remain issues, including persistent insecurity outside of GFZs which have been 
found to continue to fuel SALW demand and undermine the role of community social 
cohesion in their success. This may be seen to indicate that further success for the GFZ 
project in reducing demand for SALW may be linked to expanding the number of GFZs.  
 The varying degrees of success of these SALW interventions in reducing demand 
in Brazil, Colombia and South Africa provide a number of lessons for future efforts at 
reducing demand for SALW around the world, including in PNG. Among the lessons that 
these cases provide is the importance of the state working together with civil society where 
necessary in order to ensure maximum effectiveness for their own activities as in Brazil, 
the need for a well-rounded approached to addressing both supply and demand in the arms 
trade rather than placing disproportionate emphasis on one or the other as in Colombia and 
the important role that some community driven measures, that are largely free from 
government involvement, have played in encouraging voluntary buy-in by members of the 
community which increases the chances for success as has been shown in South Africa. 
These lessons will inform the analysis of how demand-reduction may best be used to 
address the SALW problem in PNG later in the chapter. 
  
SALW interventions in PNG 
 As with these international examples of SALW interventions, there have also been 
programmes aimed at reducing armed violence and SALW levels in PNG that have been 
found to have had an impact on demand. This examines some of these efforts, including 
the work of Kup Women for Peace (KWP), Yumi Lukautim Mosbi (YLM), Leitana Nehan 
Women’s Development Agency, the Mendi Peace Accords and the Enga Tribal Courts. 
This analysis focuses on these local level initiatives because strategies at the national level, 
like the National Gun Summit and PNGDF reform, have had limited or no effect, with the 
UNDP describing them as “largely reactive, with insufficient investment in preventive 
64 
 
measures to stop armed violence.”290 In addition, Oxfam states that when PNG is provided 
with international development assistance, for purposes such as good governance, it is 
frequently poorly directed and ineffective at addressing the underlying causes of armed 
violence.
291
 As a result of this the initiatives occurring at the local level receive no 
government support, do not inform any national level policy and the government is even 
unaware of many.
292
 It is within this environment, where effective state action is limited, 
that some of the more effective small arms interventions and demand reduction 
programmes have been organised. 
  
Kup Women for Peace 
 One of the most notable local initiatives aimed at addressing armed violence and 
SALW by civil society groups in PNG is the Kup Women for Peace. KWP was founded in 
response to on-going tribal violence in the Kup region, and the founders joined together 
across traditional tribal allegiances in order to combat the inter-group conflict and gender 
violence that was occurring. They established five objectives in order to achieve their goal 
of bringing peace to Kup and to sustain it. The first of these was “to promote peace and 
protect women’s human rights and to advocate against violence committed on women by 
individuals, tribal groups, and the state.”293 The second objective was to work to defend the 
rights of women and improve their representation in public decision making processes. The 
third objective was to engage in a public awareness campaign to educate the public of the 
risks involved in fighting between tribes along with gender violence and violence against 
children, in addition to teaching skills for the resolution of conflict. The fourth objective 
was the reform of the law enforcement and justice sectors along with policy reform so that 
populations feel secure and do not feel they have to resort to violence. The fifth and final 
objective was to help to provide the means and tools to local communities in order for 
people to be able to earn a living and be self-reliant, and encourage sustainable livelihoods 
through this.
294
 Oxfam, a partner of KWP, has evaluated the effectiveness of KWP’s 
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actions in Kup, stating that they have been able to bring an end to fighting between tribes 
in the region and have also successfully promoted peaceful development. They go on to 
say that “They put an end to tribal fighting by travelling into enemy villages and holding 
meetings with men from enemy tribes where they shared stories of suffering and tears. 
Their accounts convinced men to lay down their arms in exchange for self-led peaceful 
development.”295 Among the more tangible results that this success had are greater 
freedom of movement for locals, prompt reconciliation of conflicts between people and 
tribes, a reappearance of state services like law enforcement and health services to the 
region and a growing sense of pride and self-sufficiency within these post-conflict 
communities.
296
  
Following this success, KWP turned their efforts towards reducing the prevalence 
of gender violence in the region and developing means of subsistence as an alternative to 
violence among those most prone to it, such as youth.
297
 In addition to this, KWP and 
Oxfam are also collaborating in the Highlands regions to address similar issues as in Kup. 
They have set out to achieve this through measures such as improving basic amenities like 
water, sanitation and healthcare in addition to teaching new skills to improve employment 
prospects.
298
 In KWP’s work on tackling the problem of violence against women in PNG, 
they have implemented measures such as educating communities on women’s rights, with 
a focus on authorities such as village magistrates and police and community development; 
providing training for young women to take the role of educating communities on 
women’s rights and community development; and to target young males with a focus on 
those who are known to be violent, with education and training to improve employment 
prospects.
299
 In the years since its creation, KWP has expanded to provide training and 
education in the likes of community law and justice, youth mentoring, leadership, 
sustainable livelihoods, HIV care and counselling, curriculum development for schools and 
community health.
300
 Despite the progress that has been made in the decade since the 
creation of KWP it still faces setbacks, including a flare up of tribal violence in Kup for the 
first time in nine years which killed a significant number of people. Violent outbursts like 
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this have undermined the work done by KWP, with those people involved in KWP’s work, 
their families, homes, possessions and the services they provide being targets for this 
violence and destruction.
301
 Despite this violence directed at themselves and rival tribes, 
KWP has tentatively begun to renew their efforts at addressing inter-group violence and 
bringing peace back to Kup, with Eleanor Jackson of the International Women’s 
Development Agency writing that “The women of Kup remain steadfast in the face of 
these challenges; they are continuing to work to secure peace, to see the maintenance of a 
ceasefire, and to re-build Kup Women for Peace.”302  
This focus of KWP on education, improving the rights of women, law and justice 
reform, improving employment prospects and livelihoods and restorative justice has meant 
that the people of Kup were able to attain peace and sustain it for an extended period of 
time, largely free from a return to large scale violence for much of this period. KWP and 
the people of Kup have been able to maintain this peace over an extended period through 
the likes of peaceful development and conflict resolution, which may suggest that sources 
of insecurity and, therefore, demand for SALW in the region remained low. This is 
because these measures provided by KWP provided alternative outlets for addressing 
conflict and disagreement. That Kup remained free from large scale conflict for this 
extended period suggests that this may be the case. While these efforts by KWP have had 
success, the recent resurgence of violence in Kup shows that even where there has been 
peace for a number of years, violence can reappear quickly and just as violently as before 
and therefore requires vigilant attention to ensure that violence is avoided. It is in this way 
that KWP has had significant success in addressing the causes of violence, and therefore 
factors that influence demand for SALW, in order to maintain peace in the Kup region for 
an extended period of time. 
 
Yumi Lukautim Mosbi 
 Another civil society group that operates in PNG addressing SALW and armed 
violence is Yumi Lukautim Mosbi, which is based and operates in Port Moresby. YLM 
seeks to provide a model to enable a unified approach to addressing crime prevention and 
security in urban centres, by encouraging cooperation between provincial government, law 
and justice sectors, statute authorities, the private sector and community groups. Through 
this, YLM seeks to include a range of sectors with an interest in improving social cohesion 
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in these urban environments by strengthening law and order and enhancing local 
communities’ quality of life.303 Post PNG, one of the organisations involved in YLM, in its 
description of YLM states that “YLM is a mindset and a methodology, which is much 
more than a prescribed set of activities and as such it is quite broad.”304 The organisations 
that make up the ‘steering’ committee of YLM include the National Capital District 
Commission, the Law and Justice Sector, AusAID, City Mission, NCD Provincial Youth 
Council, Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council, PNG Sports Foundation, 
Digicel Communications, CPL PNG (a retail/wholesale company) and PNG Power. The 
activities of YLM are guided by four major themes, these are community engagement 
(particularly around crime prevention); sports and youth engagement focused on 
community spirit; reintegration and skills development for young people who show 
commitment to positive community spirit; and awareness and cross-cutting issues, which 
involves giving publicity to examples of ‘positive community change’ through YLM’s 
monthly television show.
305
  
YLM is motivated to improve urban environments for a number of reasons. Among 
these are the effects of crime on the personal security and safety of all citizens, the 
undermining of economic development, the importance of cooperation between 
communities and state agencies, the importance of multi-agency and community led 
approaches, providing alternatives to crime like employment, encouraging positive 
community spirit, poverty reduction as crime prevention and others.
306
 The cooperation 
between YLM and private companies like Digicel has contributed to projects like a 
violence hotline and free evacuation service for victims of domestic violence, safe havens 
for people under immediate threat of violence within businesses, government offices and 
public places and training centres for at risk young people among other measures.
307
 
Another initiative launched by YLM is the Yumi Lukautim Mosbi Bus Stop Safety 
Programme. This involved the NCDC, Law and Justice Sector, the Port Moresby Chamber 
of Commerce and industry bodies working together to employ local youths to provide 
security at bus stops in Port Moresby.
308
 As a part of this initiative, young people have 
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worked with police and security guards to provide security at bus stops, particularly in 
preventing petty crime like pick-pocketing and bag-snatching especially that aimed at 
women.
309
 NCD Police Superintendent Joe Tondop stated that “making the city a safe 
place, especially the bus stops, was something that everyone needed to do by ensuring that 
they do not stand and watch someone being victimised by drunkards, thieves or someone 
under the influence of marijuana.”310 It was also stated that police hoped such programmes 
would help to reinforce their own efforts by providing extra support for the undermanned 
force.
311
 The YLM programme has attracted interest from other parts of PNG where local 
governments and other groups are liaising with the NCDC leadership as to how it might 
work in their districts. In 2006, two years after the YLM pilot began, AusAID evaluated it 
and stated that “There is also anecdotal evidence that crime has reduced in at least one of 
the pilot areas and the Project has directly led to a significant increase in NCDC funding 
for Port Moresby community and social service programs in 2006 compared to 2005.”312 It 
is in this way that YLM seeks to prevent crime and ensure the security and safety of the 
citizens of Port Moresby. It does this by welcoming the participation of a number of 
different sectors, including government, business and civil society, and facilitating 
cooperation between these sectors to address issues in Port Moresby that affect security. In 
order to prevent crime in Port Moresby, it has sought to encourage the participation of at-
risk citizens, especially youth, in ensuring the security of their own community and to 
encourage their personal investment in making it a safer place. This has also provided Port 
Moresby citizens with greater employment prospects and has provided alternatives to 
resorting to crime. In addition to this, YLM projects have provided safe places for victims 
of violence and those under the threat of violence.  
This focus on crime prevention and security, and the initiatives that have been used, 
can also be suggested to have contributed to improving the conditions that have been found 
to help to reduce the demand for SALW by ensuring that there are greater employment 
prospects and that citizens have a greater sense of security. The likes of the YLM Bus Stop 
Safety Programme can be suggested to contribute to a greater sense of security for 
residents travelling by bus, thus reducing one of the factors that have been found to 
influence demand for firearms. YLM’s activities aimed at crime prevention and security 
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are designed to reduce violence, crime and improve social cohesion in Port Moresby, and 
all can be seen to be contributing factors towards reducing SALW demand. 
 
Leitana Nehan Women’s Development Agency 
 The Leitana Nehan Women’s Development Agency is another community group 
that is campaigning against violence in their part of PNG. Leitana was established during 
the Bougainville Civil War in response to the targeting of women and children by 
combatants, in order to provide support to communities during the conflict and also in the 
rebuilding phase following it, with a particular focus on women. Their work has included 
providing assistance to the rebuilding of Bougainville following the war, promoting female 
representation in positions of power, protests against the occurrence of rape during the 
conflict, conflict resolution training for communities, trying to reduce the levels of 
domestic violence and alcohol abuse, promoting peaceful cohabitation between the genders 
in Bougainville and promoting the role of women more generally.
313
 One such example of 
action taken by Leitana occurred in 2012 when a number of civil society groups in North 
Bougainville joined forces under the leadership of the Leitana to march on the 
Autonomous Bougainville Government. This demonstration was organised in response to 
growing concerns around SALW on the island and to demand their disposal, along with a 
call for the ABG to take action on SALW and other law and order issues.
314
 As a part of 
this demonstration, the groups involved presented a petition to the government who was 
represented by the Minister for Women. Among their demands within the petition were for 
authorities to discuss development issues rather than specifically guns, establish a clear 
plan for the disposal of guns and rehabilitation of ex-fighters in Bougainville, release 
financial information relating to any SALW disposal programme, ensure the government 
establishes who the ex-fighters are as many still possess their weapons, creation of laws to 
ensure the security of females and several others. In addition to these demands, they also 
called on the government to include them in government processes, as they believe they 
are key actors in efforts to address SALW and armed violence in Bougainville.
315
 In a 
similar vein to the challenges that have been faced by KWP, Leitana has been targeted by 
                                                          
313
 International Women's Development Agency, "Sad News in Bougainville: Iwda Extends Sympathy & 
Solidarity to Leitana Nehan Women’s Development Agency", 2010, http://www.iwda.org.au/2010/11/09/sad-
news-in-bougainville-iwda-extends-sympathy-and-solidarity-to-leitana-nehan-women%E2%80%99s-
development-agency/, (accessed 28 November 2012) 
314
 Jimbul, Suzanne, "Women at Work: Preventing Gun Violence", 2012, http://www.iansa-
women.org/sites/default/files/newsviews/iansa_wn_bulletin_28_en_0.pdf, (accessed 22 August 2012), p. 1 
315
 Ibid 
70 
 
others with their office in Buka, Bougainville being burned down and much of their 
equipment stolen in 2010 which affected their ability to carry out their work.
316
  
This work by the Leitana Nehan Women’s Development Agency aimed at 
rebuilding communities affected by war, improving the conditions of women, women’s 
representation in positions of power, eliminating illicit firearms still in circulation in 
Bougainville and reintegrating ex-combatants into the community and gainful 
employment, can be seen to contribute to efforts at minimising the occurrence of violence. 
Where the causes of violence are targeted effectively, it can also be suggested that demand 
for SALW is also reduced as levels of insecurity are lower and sustainable income sources 
are available. Despite these efforts, Leitana has faced challenges to its work, particularly 
through the continuing presence of SALW and the destruction of its office and theft of its 
equipment in 2010. These efforts at reducing violence and insecurity in post-conflict 
Bougainville to improve the lives of the community can also be seen to be beneficial to 
SALW demand-reduction. 
 
Mendi Peace Commission  
 Another example of a programme that has utilised measures that have been found 
to reduce the demand for SALW occurred elsewhere in PNG when the Mendi community 
came together to end the conflict that had been occurring there for several years. The peace 
efforts were led by faith-based groups, women’s groups, business leaders and development 
agencies who worked together to facilitate negotiations between the warring Wogia and 
Unjamap tribes, which resulted in an informal peace agreement and also the establishment 
of the Mendi Peace Commission in 2002, which appointed local business and church 
leaders to lead it after the state failed to get involved to end the conflict.
317
. When a 
settlement was reached that was agreeable to both of the parties, it involved each side 
agreeing to issue public apologies from their leaders, a pledge to cease hostilities, allow 
unfettered movement over lands, respect for tribal borders, ending their association with all 
hired shooters, storing all SALW under the authority of tribal leaders, stopping tribal 
members displaying weapons in public, working together with police to address drug and 
alcohol issues, stolen property to be surrendered to its original owners and compensation 
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payments.
318
 This process was undertaken in order to cement the peace agreement and to 
try and alleviate any remaining tensions so that it had the greatest chance of succeeding. 
The Mendi Peace Commission couched its efforts at finding a peaceful solution to this 
conflict within cultural traditions that had been present in PNG for centuries, specifically 
the important role of reciprocity and the complex local dynamics that inform SALW 
demand present in Mendi. This is reflected when Atwood et al state that “The organisers of 
the peace agreement recognised that any programme or intervention to mitigate gun 
violence would have to take into account these complex sets of preferences.”319  
The Peace Building Initiative reported that in the two to three years immediately 
following the Peace Accords, Mendi remained largely peaceful.
320
 In the decade since the 
Mendi peace agreement, the province has not been completely free from violence, with 
flare-ups occurring particularly around elections and politics. In 2011 a number of people 
were injured and significant property destroyed as a result of battles between the armed 
supporters of provincial administrators duelling for the role, one who had been acting 
administrator and the other who had just been reappointed. The running battles were 
largely made up of weapons like sticks, stones and knives but there were also varying 
reports of the presence of some firearms.
321
  
The Mendi Peace Accords have demonstrated that a return to traditional cultural 
values and practices can be beneficial in ending violence in PNG. Specifically, the practice 
of reciprocity and respect for local traditions has proven highly beneficial in ending the 
ongoing violence and ill-feeling between Wogia and Unjamap. The Peace Accords 
involved assurances that violence would cease, SALW would be given up, movement in 
the province would be free and compensation given so that any lingering disputes were 
settled. This meant that the causes of much of the violence in Mendi were effectively 
addressed and that the province has been free from the large-scale violence it had 
experienced. It can be suggested that, as a result of this peace, the factors that influence 
demand for SALW in Mendi may also have been reduced because much of the insecurity 
between the two tribes had dissipated. It is in this way that this local intervention against 
armed violence in Mendi provides some lessons for addressing SALW demand in PNG. 
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 Enga Tribal Courts 
 The final example of a SALW and armed violence intervention within PNG is the 
Enga tribal courts system. Having fought with one another for centuries with traditional 
weapons like bows and arrows, groups in Enga province dramatically escalated the 
bloodshed these conflicts caused when they first acquired SALW in 1990, going on to 
claim the lives of almost five thousand people.
322
 When local people grew tired of this 
constant bloodshed, by the mid-point of the 2000s, members of the community including 
tribal and religious leaders came together to find a solution. The solution they settled upon 
centred around a return to traditional values and practices, particularly ‘restorative justice’ 
carried out by village courts. This was based upon traditional practices adopted in the 
nineteenth century following several centuries of conflict over territory and other issues, 
which established a system of compensation whereby valuable commodities in the form of 
pigs and other such high-value items were paid to settle grievances, enhance the standing 
of a tribe and realign the local power structure.
323
 An anthropologist researching Enga has 
been quoted as stating that “As exchange networks grew 150 to 200 years ago, people 
without European contact created indigenous ways of making peace so exchange could 
flourish.”324  These traditional practices declined following the establishment of Australian 
rule when they were responsible for keeping the peace, but not long before independence 
conflict began to grow again until it ignited completely from 1990.  The restorative justice 
that village courts are based upon involves restitution, mainly in the form of pigs as has 
been the case for much of the provinces history, and also what is known as being sent to 
‘drink Coca Cola’, based on a historic tradition where combatants sit down together and 
make peace themselves.
325
 Several factors have been cited as contributing to the decision 
in Enga to attain and then sustain this peace after many years of conflict. These are the lack 
of economic opportunities in the region caused by war, the traditional customs and 
practices that the village courts are based upon and the use of Christianity as an ‘ideology 
for peace’.326  
When discussing the impact of the village courts, The Telegraph reported that “By 
adopting “customary justice”, which plays on a perpetrators shame, castigates him in 
public and forces him to pay hefty compensation (often spread over many years), villages 
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have almost dispensed with the need to jail, banish or kill transgressors.”327 When the 
effect of the village courts was evaluated it was found that, while the number of wars 
actually increased until 2009, they were able to be brought to an end through the village 
courts sooner and with less bloodshed than had been possible previously. When comparing 
the period 1991-95 with 2006-10, the figures show an eight per cent decrease in the 
number of conflicts with 21-300 deaths, while there was a 51 per cent increase in conflicts 
with one to five deaths which has been described as a sign that conflict is being ended 
sooner.
328
 In addition to these figures, a decrease in average deaths experienced during 
conflicts in Enga has been occurring since the early 1990s, with pre-colonial conflict 
deaths averaging 3.7, then 19 in the four years after the introduction of firearms between 
1991-95, 17 from 1996-2000, 10 from 2001-05 and finally halving to five between 2006-
10.
329
 The greatest strength of the restorative justice system is that it allows local 
communities to largely resume as they were before the crime, no matter how serious the 
crime committed was.
330
 Weissner has described the most significant conclusion of the 
Enga village courts project as being “that using indigenous means of local conflict 
resolution may be better for a government like Papua New Guinea than imposing Western 
Law.”331 The success of these courts, and the traditional customs and practices that they 
utilise, have challenged a traditional view that primitive societies are less peaceful than 
more modern ones, and that it is this progress towards ‘civilisation’ that creates a more 
peaceful society by showing that even primitive societies have sophisticated processes that 
ensure peace.
332
  
The system is not without its problems. One weakness of the village court system is 
that it is primarily focused on those who commit one-off crimes, which means that those 
who are inclined to commit serial crimes are also returned to the community, often in the 
face of the threat of death.
333
 A study on Enga’s village courts concludes that if incentives 
around natural resources and foreign aid are provided to Enga then conflict may be even 
less likely in future as the community would want to safeguard these economic 
opportunities. However it warns that the combination of a growing generation of 
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discontented youth and increasing exploitation by multinational corporations of natural 
resources could spark further bloodshed.
334
 Additionally, a growing population in Enga 
could place an increasing strain upon the restorative justice system, due to a lack of 
willingness of tribe members to make compensation payments for unknown clan members. 
Because of this, Weissner and Pupu state that “If this happens, local institutions founded 
on principles of kinship, respect and restorative justice will not suffice, and the Enga may 
find themselves in another cycle of violence as the scale of their society increases.”335 As 
we saw in the earlier section, the Enga village courts system has demonstrated the 
important role that traditional values and practices can play in PNG, particularly in 
addressing violence, crime and SALW issues. This is because the village courts utilise 
practices that have been used for centuries in order to settle disputes and address crime and 
violence, particularly restorative justice and restitution, which in turn allows victims to feel 
that they have gotten justice (especially through the provision of compensation) and it also 
allows for the restoration of the local balance of power. These village courts allow disputes 
to be settled without having to resort to violence, which had been the case for many years 
previously, which in turn reduces insecurity in these communities. It can be suggested that 
the values and practices inherent in the likes of the Enga tribal courts may also assist in 
reducing the local demand for SALW, because of the conflict resolution role it plays and 
the means it provides for preventing conflict and ensuring security. It is in this way that the 
experiences from Enga may provide lessons for the expansion of the tribal court concept 
and the ideas that underpin it into other parts of PNG. 
  
Relationship between PNG interventions and demand reduction 
This section has examined a number of interventions aimed at armed violence and 
SALW that have taken place throughout PNG, and have all been shown to play a role in 
addressing demand for SALW. These interventions share several characteristics, many of 
which can be seen to be significant for SALW demand reduction. The first is the local, 
community driven nature of the interventions. All of these initiatives began and have 
primarily been sustained within their own regions, such as Kup, Port Moresby, 
Bougainville, Mendi and Enga. The nature of this community-driven approach is that those 
community members who are involved have knowledge of the local dynamics and issues 
that are unique to the area. This local knowledge is of benefit to these bottom-up 
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approaches, as top-down approaches that are headquartered in faraway locations like the 
capital Port Moresby may not have sufficient knowledge of some of the issues unique to 
these regions. The second shared characteristic is their relative independence from the 
state. This approach brings a number of benefits. One of the major benefits is that it avoids 
some of the deep mistrust of the government and state services that is held in many parts of 
PNG, as a result of corruption, incompetence and the like, which means that civil society 
groups like those examined in this section have the benefit of greater public confidence 
which often means greater support for the initiatives they conduct in their communities. 
The third characteristic that these interventions share is their focus on the underlying 
factors that serve to facilitate armed violence and therefore serve to influence demand for 
SALW within their communities. This has involved seeking to improve education and 
employment opportunities for citizens as alternatives to crime and violence, improving the 
conditions for women and women’s representation, crime prevention and promoting 
restorative justice in order to settle disputes. Much of these efforts have involved a focus 
on traditional values and practices which have been found to have been successful in the 
past, before the arrival of SALW, and have experienced success more recently. All of these 
factors can be seen to be important in addressing SALW demand-reduction, and require 
addressing in order for demand-reduction to be successful. These characteristics will form 
an important part of the conclusions to this thesis discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has analysed programmes that have been carried out at the local level 
in PNG aimed at reducing SALW and armed violence levels. This has included the Kup 
Women for Peace, Yumi Lukautim Mosbi, Leitana Nehan Women’s Development 
Agency, the Mendi Peace Commission and the Enga Tribal Courts. In doing this, it has 
looked at the extent to which the concept of demand reduction has played a role within 
these. This chapter has provided an analysis of demand reduction, specifically relating to 
what it is and how it relates to SALW, its relation to supply, some of the activities that 
make up demand reduction and some of the actors that have traditionally been involved. In 
addition to this, a number of SALW interventions both around the world and in PNG have 
been analysed in order to evaluate their effectiveness at reducing demand. These two 
sections have been designed to inform the final section, where the relationship between 
these activities and demand reduction has been expanded upon in more detail. This will 
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also play an important role in informing the findings and conclusions discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusions 
 
This thesis has examined the role that demand reduction has played in addressing 
the issues of SALW and armed violence in Papua New Guinea. In order the establish the 
context within which this analysis has occurred, a brief overview of the global nature of the 
SALW problem as well as the international instruments that have been created to address 
this were illustrated. Following this, the nature of the SALW and armed violence issues in 
PNG were set out by examining the sources of small arms in PNG, both via the legal trade 
and illicit market, and by highlighting some of what they are most commonly used for. The 
responses to these problems that have been taken in PNG were analysed along with an 
evaluation of their effectiveness at reducing the numbers of SALW. This focused on 
instruments at the national level, such as the Firearms Act, National Guns Summit and 
PNGDF reform; instruments at the regional level, such as the Nadi Framework; and 
international instruments, including the UN PoA and the Arms Trade Treaty. Finally, the 
concept of demand reduction has been examined in order to illustrate what is involved in 
carrying it out before finally analysing the role it has played in local programmes aimed at 
SALW and armed violence in PNG and how effective they have been at reducing demand. 
Several major findings have come out of this research. The first of these findings 
was that the measures that have been, and continue to be, undertaken in PNG by the state 
to address armed violence have only had limited success in stopping the spread of SALW 
and reducing armed violence levels. This has been the result of problems such as 
ineffective implementation of existing laws like the Firearms Act, unwillingness to act 
upon the recommendations of the National Guns Summit and lack of full commitment to 
regional measures like the Nadi Framework. This is despite the support PNG has shown 
towards the likes of reform of the PNGDF, its UN PoA reporting obligations and voting in 
favour of the Arms Trade Treaty. The failure of the PNG government to take meaningful 
action in many of these areas may be attributable to a number of factors. Many of the 
problems may come down to a lack of capacity and resources of the PNG government such 
as in ensuring police stations outside of the capital can maintain their reporting 
requirements, the opposition to some measures that has been experienced such as the first 
effort at PNGDF reform and an apparent lack of willingness to follow through on the many 
commitments to law reform around firearms. These measures have also been found to be 
heavily focused on addressing the supply side of the SALW trade in PNG. This has meant 
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that even when the state has been able to reduce the supply of arms into the illicit trade, 
such as with the PNGDF reform, they have not sufficiently addressed the factors that have 
been found to influence the decisions made by people to acquire firearms. This means that, 
because these firearms have been found to have a long life in the illicit market, as long as 
demand for them continues then it is unlikely that there will be a significant reduction in 
their numbers or impact. The second, and most important, finding that came from this 
research was that, in response to these ineffective state measures, local community groups 
and NGOs have been fighting armed violence throughout PNG by focusing on the root 
causes of it and have utilised strategies that have been found to reduce demand for SALW. 
This has included focusing on causes of insecurity like conflict, economic opportunities, 
youth disenfranchisement, gender inequities and others. It was found that demand 
reduction has been growing in importance in academia and amongst disarmament 
practitioners around the world when it comes to effectively addressing SALW issues. The 
third finding from this research is that these activities may be seen to be nascent efforts in 
PNG to utilise demand reduction, as a response to the predominance of state initiatives that 
have been and continue to be aimed at the supply side of the arms trade. These initiatives 
have utilised measures that have been found to reduce demand have experienced some 
success in reducing armed violence in PNG, such as providing alternative means to end 
conflict and settle disputes through traditional customs and practices and by helping to 
provide greater economic opportunities as alternatives to taking up arms. These bottom-up, 
nascent demand reduction efforts may also be seen to complement the efforts made by the 
state in PNG to reduce the supply of SALW, which may help to form a rounded approach 
necessary for effectively targeting the entirety of the illicit SALW trade and armed 
violence. It is these findings that have helped to form the conclusion that, in response to the 
failings of state efforts at addressing SALW and armed violence, local community groups 
and NGOs have risen to the challenge and launched a number of programmes aimed at 
these issues that have been found to have contributed to nascent demand reduction efforts 
in PNG. 
 There are recommendations that can be made as a result of these findings and 
conclusions. The first of these concerns recent events in PNG, relating to the proposed 
rapid expansion of the PNGDF in terms of manpower and supplies that was outlined 
previously. Before such a move is committed to, it is advisable to ensure that the PNG 
government and leadership of the PNGDF have learned from past experiences. This means 
that they should keep in mind the lessons that the previous PNGDF reform provided, 
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around ensuring that the discipline of these new forces and the management of the 
stockpiles where the new weapons will be stored are maintained at current levels in order 
to prevent a resumption of the leakage of SALW that was caused by poor force discipline 
and stockpile management, prior to the previous rationalisation process. Another 
recommendation is that some of the lessons from these SALW and armed violence 
initiatives and demand reduction in PNG may be applicable elsewhere in the world. These 
lessons may be applicable, as one example, in states that are also experiencing difficulties 
around persistent demand issues around SALW and reluctance to expand efforts beyond 
the supply side. 
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